

Volume 20, Number 2

July 1993

CONTRIBUTIONS TO NEPALESE STUDIES



Journal of
Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies
Tribhuvan University
Kirtipur, Nepal

CNAS

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Contributions to Nepalese Studies is published two times a year in January and July. Subscription rates are subject to change without prior notice. Subscriptions should be sent in the form of bank drafts or cross-cheques in favour of Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies for Contributions to Nepalese Studies to the Nepal Bank Limited, Kirtipur. Rates are as follows:

Subscription Rates			
Country Countries	Nepal	India	Other
Single copy	Rs. 100/-	I.C. Rs. 75/-	US\$ 10.00
One year	Rs. 180/-	I.C. Rs. 140/-	US\$ 20.00
Note: Air-mail postage is included.			

का.प्र.जि.का.अ.का.प.द.नं. ३२-०३०

Contents

1. A Translation of Laksmiprasada Devakota's
"The fifteenth of the Month of Asadha"
Manfred G. Treu 149-164
2. The Tibeto-Burman Languages of Nepal: A
General Survey
Tej R. Kansakar 165-173
3. Polyandry, Adaptability and Environment: A
Case Study of Tangin, A Himalayan Village in
Nepal
Ganesh Man Gurung 175-182
4. Ethnobotanical Note on Folk-Lore Remedies of
Baglung District, Nepal
Narayan P. Manandhar 183-196
5. Bilateralism Under the Shadow: The Problems
of Refugees in Nepal-Bhutan Relations
Lok Raj Baral 197-212
6. Thinking Through Nepal's Bhutan Problem
Dhruba Kumar 213-219
7. Role of the Extra-Parliamentary Political Party
in Multi-Party Democracy: Study of the CPN-
Unity Centre
Pancha N. Maharjan 221-230

Review Article

- A Critique of Levi's Theory of the Urban
Mesocosm
Stephen L. Mikesell 231-254

Book Review

- Govinda Prasad Regmi: *Industrial Growth in
Nepal*
Bishwamber Pyakuryal 255-257

A TRANSLATION OF LAKṢMIPRASADA DEVAKOṬA'S "THE FIFTEENTH OF THE MONTH OF AṢADHA"

Manfred G. Treu

Man in completion has to live in several places and in several persons, he has to be permanently aware of a wide circle and various events. It is here that then forms itself the true spirit which makes man a real world citizen.

NOVALIS

INTRODUCTION

Among the works of Lakṣmīprasāda Devakoṭā (1909-1959), who along with Lekhanātha Paudyāla (1884-1965) and Balakṛṣṇa Sama (1902-1981) form the triumvirate of modern Nepali literature, the essay "Aṣādhako pandhra" (Nep.: "The fifteenth of [the month of] Aṣādhā") belongs to the poet's early writings. With the exception of his first poem, these were published from Vikrama Samvat (abbr. V.S.) 1991 (1934/35) onwards in the literary journal "Sārādā", which was published from Kathmandu and which became "a landmark in the history of Nepali literature."¹ The essay is believed to be the first prose writing and the first published essay by Devakoṭā. The Nepali literary critic Abhi Subedi states, "this was the first genuine and standard essay writing in Nepali," excelling all previous attempts in "technique, inventiveness, and organisation."² The style of the essay and its biographical-psychological value are outlined in a short resumé by the writer and critic Tārānātha Śarmā, saying that the first essay of Devakoṭā, written in Western style, is like all essays of his 'Lakṣmīnibandhasaṃgraha' a personal manifesto written in poetical prose.³ The essay was preceded by poems in Nepali, among them one in the form of a sonnet.⁴ Devakoṭā's second prose writing was entitled "Purva ra paścima" (Nep.: "East and West") and was published in V.S. 1995 (1938/39). The subject matter of this essay points to an important trait of Devakoṭā's work, namely his symbiotic-amalgamative approach revealing itself from his early phase and resulting in a lasting commitment to adapt and incorporate Western literary forms, humanistic ideas, and sociopolitical awareness in his writings, climaxing in the Nepali

epic "Pramīthas" based on the Greek mythological subject "Prometheus", his final work.

Two years after the essay "The Fifteenth of Aṣāḍha" a poem entitled "Kisān" (Nep.: "Farmer") was published,⁵ which shows the author's continued pursuit of the same social groups as featured in his first essay.

After its first publication in "Śārada" in 1993 V.S. (1936), the essay was published by "Bhāṣā Prakāśinī Samiti" in 2002 V.S. (91945/46) and by "Nepalī Bhāṣā Prakāśinī Samiti" in 2013 V.S. (1956/57) as part of the omnibus volume "Lakṣmī nibandha sāgraha" ("Collection of essays of Lakṣmi"). Between 2019 V.S. (1962/63) and 2044 V.S. (1987/88), the essay collection has seen ten further editions through "Sājhā Prakasana". With the exception of one case, the textual divergences of the different editions are not discussed here. For the translation of the text given below, the first edition was used.

The content of the essay projects the atmosphere and activities of a day in the Nepali month of "āṣāḍha" (June/July), called a "Mahotsava" (Skt.: "grand festival")⁶ by the author. This "grand festival", however, is not marked in the calendar of religious or national festivals in which the Himalayan Hindu kingdom abounds. It also remains unmentioned in comprehensive descriptions and studies of festivals and festive days or rites and rituals of Nepal.⁷ The day in question differs from festive days like Dasaim, Bālachaturdaśī, Sivarātri, Prithvījayantī, etc., in as much as it is not centered around a god or goddess, a king or hero, an ancestor, a demon or a spirit. It furthermore is not disposing of pomp or glamour, or of unusual performances. Bearing no extraordinary audio-visual focus point, no ritualistic make-up which might attract the eye and interest of a spectator or researcher, it nevertheless portrays an essential and typical trait of Nepalese culture which is overall marked by the predominance of its agrarian background.

The fifteenth of Aṣāḍha is a day of rice-planting, specifically the planting of the rice seedlings into the field. All over the country people living from the soil⁸ are engaged in a common task. Only those parts of the country where rice planting is not possible are excluded. Sharing the same kind of aim and work is what essentially characterizes the "grand festival" which is more a long day of work than one of festive rest. The day's labour, consisting mainly of manual fieldwork, cares for livelihood of the families. The activities of the farmers on that day bear fruit in the form of provision of a basic but in the hilly regions most valuable and appreciated food for the next one year. Collective labour, singing, dancing, eating, and playful interactions of the young people, even of opposite sexes, are its visible

elements. These factors seem to generate a mood of general happiness all over the country on that day.

It is of historical interest that at the time of *Prthvī Nārāyaṇa Sāha* even their Majesties the King and Queen followed a custom of taking part in the act of planting rice and receiving a "tīkā" (cf. note 19) of mud from the farmers on that day.⁹

To the basic structure of the day belongs its climatological function, making it quasi-synonymous with the beginning of the monsoon season bringing the sufficient amount of water necessary for the growing of rice in areas with normal or little water supply. Eighty-five percent of the rice grown in Nepal is cultivated under rain-fed conditions.¹⁰ The summer monsoon usually starts during the last days of the month of "jyēṣṭha" (May/June) in the eastern parts of Nepal and from there spreads westward. Two weeks later it will have affected all the areas under the influence of the monsoon.

In the lunar religious calendar, the fifteenth of *Aṣāḍha* can fall on certain days of the half-monthly lunar periods (Skt. *pakṣa*) of "jyēṣṭha śukla" (Skt. "bright") -, "āṣāḍha kṛṣṇa" (Skt. "dark") -, or "āṣāḍha śukla pakṣa". There are no public religious celebrations during this time of the year except for a few local festivals and the prominent and widely observed festival of "Hariśayanī" on "āṣāḍha śukla ekādaśī" (Skt. "the eleventh day of the bright (=waxing) half of the lunar month of *Aṣāḍha*"), which never precedes but always follows the fifteenth of *Aṣāḍha*. "Hariśayanī" (Skt. *Viṣṇu's* lying down) marks the beginning of a four month sleep of god *Viṣṇu* as *Hari* coinciding with the period of major release from field work for the farmers between the planting and harvesting of rice. The prospects of a time of repose after the long days of planting may perhaps contribute to the joyful mood of the people described by *Devakoṭā*.

When asked why the fifteenth of *Aṣāḍha* and not any other day of the month has become the special day for rice planting, people often mention its astrological significance of being regarded as the longest day of the year. As such it would be comparable to the twenty-first of June, the day of the summer solstice on the northern hemisphere according to the Gregorian calendar. In fact the date regularly falls on the twenty-ninth of June, exceptionally on the twenty-eighth. The conception of being the longest day, however, is held by the population at large, not by present-day astrologers. Complimentarily, the fifteenth of the month of *Pauṣa* (December/January) is regarded as the longest night and generally equivalent to the thirtieth of December. The fifteenth of *Aṣāḍha* as calendar, which on the whole is less often used than the lunar one in celebrative or commemorative occasions. The date forms part of the eight days before and after midsummer, granting a

maximum duration of daylight.¹¹ The long daylight helps the farmers to be highly efficient in one day's time of work.

Illustrating the meaning of the month of Aṣāḍha is the often cited proverbial saying: "Mānu khāi murī ubjāune (belā)" which means in equal shortness (the time of) producing one "murī" after eating [only] one "mānu". (Nep. "mānu"/"mānā": measurement by weight equal to approximately one pound or half a kilogram; Nep. "murī" a measurement by weight equal to approximately one hundred and sixty pounds or forty kilograms). In modern terms it could be rendered as "getting large output with little input." the proverb is explained by Kṛṣṇaprasāda Parājuli as "Time of earning, which is to say, the hasty work of the month of Aṣāḍha. Isn't that so? Where do you roam about at this time of hard pressing work? Now is 'the time of yielding one murī after eating one mānu.' (By) working hard now gold can be caused to grow afterwards."¹²

In the mind of the population, the most frequent association with the fifteenth of Aṣāḍha after "rice planting" is, however, the thought of "(the day of) eating beaten rice and curd (Nep.: "dahī ciurā khāne")", uttered with a smile. The custom of eating curd and beaten rice in the field is commonly believed to help increase the fertility of the soil. The practice is even continued by urban families now living without cultivable land at their disposal.

Devakoṭā attests and reflects the inherent culinary aspect of the day when he gives his individual formula for celebrating that day as "I do not want to offer beaten rice and curd, I want to present a song."¹³ This sentence stands like a motto for his writing about the fifteenth of Aṣāḍha. Devakoṭā's proclaimed intention is expressed in the context of thoughts on true poetic creation and intellectual culture, where he tries to walk on new paths. Its end suggests a search for a renewal through redefining the norms for Nepali literature and arts.

The poet's wish of presenting a song goes well along with the narrative frame of the essay's topic of the author's walk from his home to an elevated place in nature where he reposes and from where he returns home later in the day. From the combination of song, moving around in the outside, and halting at places, one can be led to imagine the portrait of a bard of the Sanskrit tradition or a "gāine" (Nep.: "minstrel") of the particular and still extant Nepalese tradition.¹⁴

A parallel between the possible consequences of the day of "rice planting" and the days of "pajānī" and "thamautī" is drawn in the popular saying: "ropāīmā dūlne pajānīmā bhulne": "Roaming around at [the time of] rice planting is equal to being forgotten at [the time of] 'pajānī'." "Pajānī" marked the day of the proclaimed order of the Śāha kings, and from the time of Janga

Bahādur Rāṇā onwards the order of the Rāṇā prime minister, with regard to the annually granted extension, transfer, dismissal or promotion of the government service holders. At the time of Devakoṭā it was customary that the speaker of the Rāṇā prime minister announced the order in front of Simha Darbār, sometimes with the de facto leader of the country presiding over the act from the balcony. As a token of reverence and acceptance of the order, a coin was deposited at his feet by those whose names were read out and who agreed. "Thamautī" is the Nepali term for "extension of tenure of office". Almost exclusively for the officials of the Rāṇā family, held either on the same day or on a separate one preceding the day of "pajanī" by a couple of weeks, the function of "thamautī" was held for the same purpose. Probably because of the repetitive announcement of the word "thamautī", the function became called after it. During the time of Candra Samser (1901-1928)¹⁵ the day of "pajanī" was regularly held on "srāvana sukla pañcamī".¹⁶ The system was changed to the months of "Vaisakha/Jyestha" during the reign of Juddha Śamser (1932-1945). It was abolished with the introduction of a parliamentary form of government in 2007 V.S.. With it the system of the "fiscal year" starting from "Śrāvana" and ending in "Aṣāḍha" came into use.¹⁷

The formulation "The life-breath of man receives its annual extension"¹⁸ used by Devakoṭā while entering into the mood of the farmer boys and girls also refers to the now historical custom of "pajanī". In Devakoṭā's metaphor an equivalence between the natural order and the political order is alluded to, but its aim is not the creation of a harmony but rather the demonstration of the superiority of the farmers' life-style over against the office holders'. In the same context a subtle comparison is drawn with even the greatest festival of Nepal "Dasaim" (Durgābhavānīpūjā) when parents present a yearly renewed "tīkā"¹⁹ to their children: "It looked as if the earth had given a mark of blessing on the forehead of the peasant youths."²⁰

From a folkloristic point of view, the eminent Nepalese scholar and literary critic Pārasmaṇi Pradhāna summarizes the charm of the essay in his monograph on Devakoṭā, saying, "Rabindranath Tagore, the Nobel Prize Winner, drew his inspiration from nature and man ... In the same way, Laxmi Prasad got his inspiration to write *Asārko Pandraha* i.e. the busy days of *Asār* from the busy life of the jolly hill-folk during the busy month of *Asār*, when they transplant the young green rice plants in the hill terraces of their pleasant paddy-fields. How they forget their worries and toil in their lovely fields singing and dancing accompanied by bethi i.e. the music of the occasion is worthy of praise."²¹

The psycho-emotional dimension of the month of Aṣāḍha and the beginning of the rainy season is almost incantatorily touched upon by Dharmarāja Thāpā and Hamsapure Suvedī. While exploring the field of folk

literature of Nepal, they depict and characterize the spirit of the month of Aṣāḍha as "Singing the songs of Aṣāḍha, planting the fields, having fun. In this way, having diffused to all the feeling of Aṣāḍha has become long-lived in the life of the people. In the sentimental hearts of the people it will linger on for ages – never to be forgotten and never to get lost – be it so!"²²

In his first essay and prose writing, Devakoṭā concentrates mainly on three levels of observation and reflection: description of nature and her emotional impact, verbal and non-verbal forms of archaic human expression, and feelings and thoughts regarding his ideals of life and art. The author's non-traditional thoughts about literature become obvious in his criticism of prevalent trends in Npeali poetry which he qualifies as pretentious and old fashioned.²³ The essay culminates when the author compares the natural human products of poetry and music to the quality and achievements of trained and taught artistic production. He feels that the untrained, natural way of expression is superior to the artificial one because it contains a greater and purer intensity of feeling.²⁴ In the first research on Devakoṭā and his works by a western scholar, David Rubin sees "Devakoṭā discovering true poetry not in the literary journals but in the songs of the peasant reapers [sic]."²⁵

The essay as a whole mirrors Nepal's state between general antiquity and isolated avantgardistic modernity, shifting slowly from rural to urban forms of life. Son of an orthodox Nepali Brahmin and foremost writer and humanist of Nepal, Lakṣmīprasāda Devakoṭā had grew up solely in the Nepal-Indo-Tibetan cultural environment. Only until a later period, after having become a minister of state, did he leave it – a culture which, however, shows signs of disintegration and alienation in the beginning of the twentieth century, thus provoking and legitimizing the author's search for new horizons and the revelations of the higher beauties of Nepalese life. The matter of description and deliberation is a unique example from the rich world of festivals, auspicious acts, and celebrations in Nepal. Here, however, not seen through a researcher's distanced eye, but rather felt in depth and expressed by an indigenous heart. Devakoṭā's attitude of mind at this early stage of life was highly influenced and formed by western romanticism. In "Aṣāḍhako pandhra" he tried to build upon his knowledge gained from western literary forms and spiritual orientation. With this essay Devakoṭā probably achieved one of the first truly romantic writings in Nepali language. Although the tenor of the writing is essentially subjective, it nevertheless also objectively reflects Nepalese culture on a broad level.

The translation of this tiny piece of Asian literature from the original Nepali into an international language may contribute to a better understanding of an alien contemporary society and culture by providing an

authentic insight into the twentieth century Nepalese world of thought and feeling. The message of this literary document seems to imply an attempt towards the creation of a conscious cultural identity and self-understanding on the part of the outstanding poet and writer Lakṣmīprasāda Devakoṭā who, in native terms, "gave a golden touch to many forms of literature."²⁶

THE FIFTEENTH OF [THE MONTH OF] ASADHA (Translation)

There is rejoicing in Nepal. The heart extends a loving welcome to the newly arrived guest. As soon as the enchanting countenance of today's dawn at the edge of the horizon over the eastern ridges became visible, the rose-red colour of blissfulness ascended to the many coloured stretch of scattered clouds, for a second the colour of heaven slightly [making] the earth reddish brown. There was a particular charm in the rosy dawn of today. A distinctive merriment of the heart was lying in today's sunrise. The look of love adds wonderment to the beauty of nature, the colour of emotion ennobles the world. Sweet waves are rolling in the heart of Nepal. Today there is that thankfulness and delight which occurs when heaven responds on hearing one's call. By the command of God and through His mercy for His children the earth has acquired youthfulness. We go to plant rice in the hope of a golden harvest; in our hands are the green rice seedlings, in our minds are joyfulness and longing, in our hearts is a light rhythmic quivering, in our throats surge up the sweet songs of our hearts. Today we enter the soft, swampy fields. Today is the planting of joy in Nepal, today is the fifteenth of *Aṣāḍha*.²⁷

In this mainly agricultural country the day of rice-planting²⁸ is a nationwide festival. On this day the magic of life touches the cottages standing squeezed together in different corners [of the countryside]. In the twilight of the morning the godly messenger of *Vanaspati*²⁸ raises his voice in the courtyard of a farmhouse. The farmers' children welcome the morning by clapping their small hands with joy. Blinking his eyes in the sweet dream of the morning, the farmer now also opens his eyes in the pleasant state of waking up to reality. After he noted the agreeable speech, the gentle laughter and the jumping of the young boys, [his] folksong makes them dance for a moment, fervently snapping the fingers of his open, honest hands. The moment, however, the mother of these boys lights up her sparkling eyes laughing in an open, innocent way, the preparations for the planting start. The villagers and the farmers, who on other days are engaged in manifold activities, all go dancing, jumping, and singing with mattocks in their hands to every field and plantable space. Taking a fistful of seedlings, the exuberant lasses laugh, singing little songs only, some in a loud, some in a restrained manner, whilst, in between, teasingly looking at each other out of their

youthful nature. The air is resounding with their song. In the cool breeze their high, clear, natural voices are an oblation from the incense of the heart. The natural sweetness of such throats causes the whole rigid path of the art of singing, all the sweat-demanding drills of the masters, the unnatural faces of the singer of a *mahaphil*,³⁰ the swaying of heads³¹ of all the frustrated connoisseurs, the whole art of singing of the civilized world to blush from shame. Their open voices are not the slaves of exercise, these words are an emission from the heart. It is the emphasis on joyfulness and feeling that gives an innate sweetness to them. No cuckoo needs to sweat in taking up [the learning of] the *tānapura*.³² In these neighbours of nature the semblance of primeval singing which comes from the bottom of the heart is met; today the hillocks and hills, mountains, slopes, plantable spaces, all are resounding with this hearty sound. Voices from the heart are whirling in the wind, tugging even at [our] hearts of stone. The true voices from the heart of Nepal are rising, are lilting on this day.

It is not that this rejoicing and this felicity have not touched the town, too, which is trying to stay apart, having separated itself from nature. The awareness that today is the fifteenth of Aṣāḍha is manifested well in all town dwellers. They also experience a new kind of felicity. Maybe our forefathers shed sweat on the earth in the same way too. The feeling of felicity on this day has probably come partly from them. To some extent it even seems as if by the theory of mutual influence, the condition of the farmers has entered the roofs of all.

We want to take some time off from the life of give-and-take. Our hearts are hearing the voice of nature's invitation in the fields of today. Our bodies, too, are drenched with the juice of the earth where today's planting is taking place. Even though we may remain apart, still we are the relatives of nature.³³ We are also invited to today's rejoicing. In our lives too we have experienced the felicity of various forms of planting. In the fields of art and literature we have received that very delight of planting. Our very first effort, too, resembled this planting and its beauty. Today we are offering our first congenial reverence to the planting. The fifteenth of Aṣāḍha is also a most welcome guest of the town.

With this invitation I too went out together with a friend in order to enjoy the pleasures of this day. Our handicapped life enclosed by four walls and a roof finds distraction beneath the wide sky and in the open air; with this amicable thought in mind I went out. I had no particular destination, the movement of my feet was not bound by any aim of going to a particular place. On the way a familiar person asked me, "Where are you going?" I answered, "Somewhere." There was a long distance, indicating phonological lengthening³⁴ in the pronunciation of "Somewhere." While walking we

reached a certain place, whose common name I would not want to mention and sweep away the magic of my experience from the reader. We sat down in an elevated place. The eastern slopes had become green; their bluish face possessed the magic of a strange indistinctiveness. From between the scattered shreds of cloud, the sun god's brightness had caused the range of vision to be spotted by shadow and light. On the far reaching mountains the beauty of verdure showed itself in all the open spaces touched by the sunlight; again a shadow fell and beneath the magic of the same bluish indistinctiveness the planting was going on. Stooping village lasses, swinging³⁵ their necklaces of coralstone, were planting rice seedlings, were singing songs. While doing the same kind of work, the peasant youths answered back (with their song).³⁶ A little further away two cottages appeared like two retreats, as if, sleeping, having found themselves a clean courtyard.

Here, there was singing, there was poetry, the pens of the speed writers³⁷ could not have moved as fast as *Sarasvatī*³⁸ in those tongues. A question was put from one side, (and) immediately the appropriate answer followed from the other side, and this even in a musical, natural metre. It would appear as if the poems of "*Śāradā*"³⁹ were only verses of laborious work. Here there was an uninterrupted flow, a gushing, which was not to be found in all of the heavy pieces published in it. Hearing their voices it seemed as if the weight of figures of speech, rhyme, metaphor, and so forth were only shackles on the neck of poetry. In them was that true sweetness which is only present in the language of feeling, not in the language of thought. When even the most common man is touched by a stimulating feeling, then an unusual quality of pronunciation manifests itself. In the genuine weeping of man there is always poetry as there is in true joy. We want to compose poems rather than let them out; they do not compose them, they draw them out from inside. We possess the competence of words, they the sweetness of feeling. Let the poets weaving garlands of worn-out words come with me on the fifteenth of *Aṣāḍha*. My invitation is also extended to those who try to sprinkle loud, artificial colour.⁴⁰ I do not want to offer beaten rice and curd, I want to present a song.

Below us the planting was going on, at the same time some fun and games, too. One girl was pelting another with a little mud from her hands. This day is understood as rejoicings of love and happiness as well as a pelting with mud. For today the splashes and patterns of mud are the beautiful ornaments on the clothes and faces of the village girls. The mud of rejoicing and love; dark spots like the ones of hatred and greed are not visible. It looked as if the earth had given a mark of blessing on the forehead of the peasant youths. The life-breath of man receives its annual extension.

Some green plants from the edge of the rice field are fastened to a girl's hair, some green rice seedlings are sprinkled on the hair of another one. Some wear the red *Asāre* flowers,⁴¹ others also one or two tender wisps of maize. Here, there are the enchanting vistas of life.

Now lunchtime had come. Round green plates of lotus leaves, designed and made by the hands of nature, were laid out at the edge of the field. Some beaten rice and salt, a ginger preparation along with a small portion of potatoes in spicy oil were placed down. All came and sat in different places, sat as in the age preceding the revelation of the law and of the rules of good behaviour. They started to eat to their heart's content. It appeared as if they were forgetting the world for half an hour through the flavour of a suggestion of paradise.⁴² Their fatigue adds a novel taste to the completely coarse, dry food; an unprecedented pleasantness is growing. We try to find taste outside, they draw it out from inside. We add aroma to spices and inflict too much maltreatment on the liver. In them the peculiar happiness of a life of hardship showed itself in the crunching of their beaten rice. Although God has not granted the means for pleasure to the poor, He has given the taste of pleasure and joy. The right use of the limbs of the body had seasoned the variety on the leaves of that lotus flower; physical exercise, as cook, had prepared a feast of joy. While they ate, all kinds of frolicking, laughing, and winking were going on. The crunching of beaten rice was not allowed to turn into a tedious ritual, the laughter in between also gave relaxation as well as increasing the taste. They were the Greek gods of an Olympus in the form of the mountains of Nepal. Water which had come flowing from inside the mountain was made to trickle down in a thin shining line from the spout [consisting] of a cowpea leaf.⁴³ It was that which served as the uninterrupted flow of cool nectar for their thirst.

They started to work again. For a long time we looked on, listened. Thick clouds had accumulated in the sky, some raindrops fell, it became even darker and a heavy rain poured down. We had no umbrella with us. At first we thought of running away, but the rain enveloped us, made us wet. There was no escape by fleeing. We slowly moved towards our home.

As for them in the field, they were planting while singing with even more joy. From a little further away we heard:

"It's the time of rice planting,
lightening has struck,
the showering of rain sang a song;⁴⁴
the clouds' clapping [the rhythm]
- the river jumped up -
made my heart dance.
The ornamentation of mud

imprinted on the blouse
 is beautiful today;
 today we laugh,
 today we sing.
 Tomorrow, oh my God! who weeps
 because death has taken away!"

Our clothes had become wet through and through too, stained by the mud as well. It seemed that we, too, had well celebrated today's festival of the fifteenth of Aṣāḍha. We, having also performed the planting today, were making our way back home. When I arrived, I felt a strange happiness; inside the house everyone was wearing a smile. I said, "Today is the fifteenth of Aṣāḍha."⁴⁵

NOTES

1. Kumar Pradhan, *History of Nepali Literature*, p. 196
2. Abhi Subedi, *Nepai Literature: Background and History*, p. 174
3. Tārānātha Sarmā, *Nepālī sāhityako itihāsa*, p. 140
4. According to the chronology given by Kumarabahadur Jośī, "Mahākavi Devakoṭā ra unkā mahākāvya", p. 328
5. Republished in "Bhikhārī", a collection of selected poems by Lakṣmīprasāda Devakoṭā, p. 35-38. First publication in *Śārada*.
6. L.P. Devakoṭā, "Aṣāḍhako pandhra" in: *Śārada*, Varsa 4, Anka 9, V.S. 1993, p. 19, l.c.
7. Mary M. Anderson, *Festivals of Nepal*; Satyamohan Jośī, *Nepālī cādaparva*; Mary Slusser, *Nepal Mandala*; Punyaratna Vajrācārya, *Hāmro cāda-parva*; Toyānātha Pantako pañcānga (pātro) V.S. 2046, ed. Premanātha Panta et al.
8. Comprising more than ninety percent of the population of Nepal even today (according to government official statistics of the 80s).
9. I owe this information to Jñānamani Nepala, CNAS.
10. Rajeshwar Nath Mallick, *Rice in Nepal*, p. 32
11. For the importance of hours of sunlight per day in rice growing, see R.N. Mallick, op. cit.
12. 'Mānu khāera murī ubjāune belā' Kamai garne samaya arthāt asāra māsako dhamādham. Haina, kāmakō mārāmāra bhaeko belāmā pani timi kahām rallinchau? 'Mānu khāera murī ubjaune belā' yahī ho. Ahile besamarī khate po pachi suna phalāuna sakincha." Kṛṣṇaprasada Parājuli, "Nepālī ukhāna ra gāumkhāne kathā", p. 132
13. "Ma dahi ciurā khuāuna cāhanna, gīta śunāuna sahanchu." L.P. Devakoṭā, loc. cit., p. 21, l.c.

14. This comparison will not be accepted by Nepalese readers because it is based on different caste membership. The bard of Sanskrit literature is a high-caste member: "chetri" (Nep.) and "bāhuna (Nep.), "kṣatriya" (Skt.) and "brāhmaṇa" (Skt.), whereas the "gaine" of Nepal is a member of a lower caste, unidentifiable with by high-caste members.
15. The time of the regency of Rāṇā prime ministers is given according to Netra B. Thapa, "A short history of Nepal" p. 185
16. Ludwig Stiller emphasises that, in general, it was the king's personal decision when to hold or not to hold "pajani". *The Silent Cry*, p. 254
17. I owe the historical information of this paragraph to Candradeva Ojhā and Dinesarāja Panta.
18. "Mānisako prāṇalāi varṣa dinako thamautī mildacha." L.P. Devakoṭā, loc. cit., p. 21, l.c.
19. A mark of blessing on the forehead, usually consisting of a coloured (vermilion) powder of natural substances, often mixed with rice grains.
20. "Kisān kā thitāharuka nidhārmā prthivīle āśīrvādako tikā lagāi die jasto bhāna pardacha." L.P. Devakoṭā, loc. cit., p. 21, l.c.
21. Paras Mani Pradhan, *Mahakavi Laxmi Prasad Devkota*, p. 57
22. "Asāre gāera, kheta ropera, ramāilo garera. Yasarī asārakā bhāvanā samcāra bhaera hāmro lokajīvanamā cirajīvita bhairachechan. Yugayugasamma bhāvuka lokahrdāyamā tāmssiirahanechan - manastalabāta kahilyai nabirsine ra naharāune garera. Astu." Dharmarāja Thāpā ra Hamsapure Suvedī, "Nepālī lokasāhityako vivecanā", p. 149
23. "Jadāurī sabdakā mālā gāmsne kavīharu masanga āśādhako pandhramā āun. Carko krtrima ranga cādhāuna khojnelāi panī mero nimantranā cha." L.P. Devakoṭā, loc. cit., p. 20, r.c., seq.
24. Different literary approaches are taken while choosing the same season or else the same activities as objects in a poem by Kedarman Vyathit and in a "Khandakāvya" by Lekhanātha Paudyāla. Whereas the latter keeps in line with traditional Sanskrit poetics, images, and ideals in describing the monsoon period among the other seasons of Nepal in his "Rtu vicāra", the former one tries to build a consciousness for national and social action in his poem no 20 of "'Cinta' - bāṭa" from the poem collection "Saṃgama", p. 86-88. (The poem has been entitled "The Ears Of Paddy" by the translators Madhav Lal Karmacharya and Ayodhya Prasad Pradhan in Kedarman Vyathit, *Selected Poems*.) The rainy season as literary theme is well known from Sanskrit literature through Kālidāsa's "Meghadūta".
25. David Rubin, *Nepali Visions' Nepali dreams*, p. 19
26. Kumar Pradhan, *History of Nepali Literature*, p. 196

27. Name of the month with which the rains of the summer monsoon start.
28. The growing of rain-fed rice in Nepal takes place in two steps: The seeds are sown thickly on the watery surface of the ploughed and smoothed seedbed. Under favourable conditions shoots become visible after four or five days (on a water-free soil surface). When the stalks reach a height of about 15 to 30 cm the seedlings are transplanted in small bundles at a span's distance into the prepared fields. Depending on the sum of the conditions, it takes about three to five weeks between sowing and transplanting. (These are the author's own observations. For a detailed description and comparisons of different conditions, see Rajeshwar Nath Mallick, op. cit.)
29. God of plants.
30. A place of song and dance in Indian Moghul culture.
31. The image refers to the particular movement of the head of South-Asian music lovers responding to certain sound structures.
32. Indian string instrument, often played in classical music.
33. In this narrative passage the forms of the first person plural can also be read, as first person singular. The assumption of a plural is majestatis being a common feature in Nepali and Hindi oral expression is supported by the author's shift to "hūm" as predicate of "hāmī" in this sentence, instead of "chaum/haum" as in the preceding formulation, and as later on amended to in the second edition of the text: "Dūrahe pani hāmī prakṛtikā nātādā haum." L.P. Devakoṭā, "Asadhako pandhra" in *Lakṣmī-nibandha-saṃgraha* (2002 ed.)
34. Skt "pluta": prolated to three units of the length of a vowel. The lengthening of "tā" in "katā katā" intensifies the indefiniteness of the expression.
35. Text reads "cacakri", I amend to "cakri".
36. This singing is obviously done in the form of the "doharī gīta" where separate groups of usually boys and girls sing an alternate song, which is basically spontaneously composed. The "doharī gīta" is also cultivated in public shows of prized competition in present day Nepal. Some examples of the often erotic content of rice planting songs of the ethnic group of the Nevārs from the Kathmandu valley have been translated and commented on by Siegfried Lienhard *Nevārī gītimāñjarā*, p. 90 ff.
37. Nep. "āśukavi", a poet who can compose extempore or at high speed. Devakoṭā himself later became known as one of the foremost among those poets. "[The long epic poem] Sulocanā is Devakoṭā's [product

- of] imagination of ten days" (Sulocanā Devakotāko dasa dine kalpanā ho). Rāmamañi Risāla, *Nepālī kāvya ra kavi*, p. 114.
38. Hindu goddess of art and learning.
39. Name of the first journal of literature in Nepal, coedited for a period by L.P. Devakotā. Bālachandra Śarmā, *Nepālī Sāhityako Itihāsa*, p. 150
40. An allusion to poets using high sounding, inflated diction. Cf. note No. 23.
41. Nep. "asāre(kā) phula", the flower of the tree "Lagestroemia flosreginae Retz, Lythraceaeindica" which blossoms in the month of Asāḍha (botanical name according to Keshab Shrestha *A field guide to Nepali names for plants*; Turner identifies it as "Viburnum erubescens").
42. Skt/Nep. "alakāpurī", the capital city of Kubera, the God of riches, situated on Mount Kailāśa.
43. In fields and forests a leaf is put as a lip to a small natural water basin, occasionally supported by some handfuls of clay to heighten or strengthen the border from where water for drinking or washing is collected.
44. Text reads "gīda", I amend to "gīta".
- *45.* I wish to thank the Tribhuvan University Library, the Madan Puraskar Pustakalaya, and the Kaiser Library for kindly allowing me to consult their materials. Notes No. 10 and 20 I owe to Prof. Dr. S.P. Lohani's valuable comments. Thanks are also due to Frances and Ben for revising my English. The translation has benefitted from readings by Dr. P.P. Devakota and Prof. Dr. S.P. Lohani.

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THE TIBETO-BURMAN LANGUAGES OF NEPAL A GENERAL SURVEY

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
Scope of the Survey

'Tibeto-Burman' is now generally accepted as a designation for a group of genetically related languages within the Sino-Tibetan family. The Sino-Tibetan and in particular the Tibeto-Burman languages, however, still pose many classificatory problems due largely to insufficient linguistic evidence. The complexity of the problems involved can be seen in the works of Shafer (1955; 1966-70), Voegelin and Voegelin (1964-66; 1977) and Benedict (1972), all of whom attempted to cover the Sino-Tibetan as a whole, while the treatment given by Grierson and Konow (1903-1928) represents an areal survey of Tibeto-Burman languages. There is obviously a good deal of linguistic diversity and geographical area over which these languages are spoken, but the scope of the present survey is restricted strictly to the Tibeto-Burman languages spoken in Nepal and the neighbouring areas of North India, Bhutan and Tibet.

Language Classification

Apart from many overviews and in-depth studies available on the T-B family, Grierson and Konow (1903-1928) is a basic source for an overall classification of the T-B languages. The parts on T-B provide not only discussions of the characteristic features of the family and its subgroups but also useful word lists and free translations of various texts. Shafer's *Introduction to Sino-Tibetan* (1966-1973) is an attempt to establish genetic classification on the basis of phonological comparison and reconstruction. Benedict's *Sino-Tibetan, a Conspectus* (1972) is in many ways a controversial work on methodological grounds, but remains an important source of information on Proto-T-B phonology and morphology. Voegelin and Voegelin's *Languages of the World Series* (1964-66; 1977) are by far the most comprehensive in terms of discussions on language classification and distribution of speakers, but contain scanty linguistic data. Gerd Hanson

(1991) has given a classification of the T-B- languages and dialects of Eastern Nepal based on field research of the Linguistic Survey of Nepal. His focus was on the grouping of Kiranti languages, while Weidert and Subba (1985) covered the same field with concentration on Limbu grammar and lexicon. For our purpose, however, Soren Egerod's article "Sino-Tibetan languages" published in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1974) seems a good starting point. His classification follows the broad groupings of Shafer (1955) (Bodic, Burmic and Baric), and in some respects the sub-groupings of Benedict (1972) who organized the T-B family into seven nuclei or divisions:



* Kechin is taken as the centre of T-B linguistic diversification.

Figure 1. Affiliation of T-B, after Benedict (1972)

Tibetic (Bodic) languages: The Tibetic or Bodic division is the most relevant to the present survey, and Table 1 represents a partial classification of the Bodish-Himalayish and Kirantish languages, the majority of which are spoken within Nepal with some marginal spread over the adjacent areas of Assam and Sikkim in northern India. It is convenient to divide these languages into six groups: Tibetan, Gurung, Kham, Magar, Limbu, and Rai groups, with references to their locations in Shafer's classification (1955). The divisional classification of languages like Newari and Dhimal, however, has been left uncertain although Newari was identified by Benedict (1972) as belonging to the Bahing-Vayu (Kiranti) group.

**Table 1: Bodish-Himalayish and Kirantish
languages of the Bodic division**


Bodish-Himalayish languages	Areas spoken
<u>Tibetan Group:</u>	
Tibetan (Lhasa, Tichurong, Dolpo/Dolpali) Sherpa, Lhomi, Jirel, Surel, Kagate	Tibet, North-East Nepal and Western India.
<u>Gurung Group</u>	
Eastern and Western Tamang/Murmi, Gurung, Thakali/Thaksya, Manang/Manangba, Nishangba, Kaika, Chantel	Central hills of Nepal.
<u>Kham Group:</u>	
Kham (Maikot, Babang, Takashera)	Western Nepal
<u>Magar Group:</u>	
Raji, Bramu/Bhramu, Thami Byangsi, Janggali, Kusunda;	West and South-West Nepal
Magar, Cepang, Dura, Bhujel/Bhuji, Vayu/Hahu, Raute/Banrawat	Central and East Nepal
Kirantish Languages:	
<u>Limbu Group:</u>	
Limbu (Phidim, Changi, Taplejung, Maiwa Khola, Terhathum) Yakha / Yakthomba, Lepcha / Rong	Eastern Nepal, Sikkim, and W.Bhutan
<u>Rai Group:</u>	
Sunavar, Khambu, Bantawa Rai, Thulung, Kulung, Chamling, Khaling, Sangpang	Eastern Nepal
<u>Other Bodic languages:</u>	
Newari, Pahari, Dhimal, Toto, Meche	Central Nepal, Southern Nepal and Northern India.

The grouping of languages and the distribution of speakers as shown in Table 1 are, however, subject to certain overlaps, and it is beyond the scope of this survey to indicate precisely what linking relationships exist between different groups. It is also not our purpose here to review the entire family tree nor the classificatory problems represented in the works of various T-B scholars and linguists. For a recent overview of synchronic and diachronic comparative research on T-B languages, see Hale (1982).

Comparative Perspectives on Language Structures

Particular Language Systems: The Himalayan region is commonly recognized as a rich linguistic area but the comparative methods developed so far to account for genetic relationship or typological classification of languages have remained unstable and lacking in common consensus. The reason for this may be that all areas of linguistic structure-phonology, lexicon, morphology, syntax, and semantics – of T-B languages are not yet amenable to intensive research, and comparative linguists are often forced to work almost entirely with vocabulary. Matisoff (1978) is a pioneer attempt to include specific semantic fields as a crucial tool for comparative research on T-B languages. The theory of semantic correspondence, if it can be rigorously applied, would undoubtedly lend support to the study of similarities in sound and form of related words.

One broad feature of the Himalayan languages is the pronominalized and non-pronominalized distinction. The phenomenon of 'pronominalization' has to do with the affixation of pronoun-like formatives to the root verb to indicate agreement to the subject and the object (direct and/or indirect). Grierson and Konow (1909) recognized the Austric (or Munda) substratum as the explanation for pronominalization in Himalayan languages, and provided the following broad classification:



* Thaksya/Thakali has now been confirmed as non-pronominalized.

Figure 2. Pronominalized and non-pronominalized Himalayan languages of Nepal, after Grierson and Konow (1909)

Another basis for language grouping is through lexicostatistics. Glover (1971, 1974) computed cognate groupings for thirty languages of the Bodic division spoken in Nepal and arrived at percentages of semantic and phonetic features shared by two or more diverging languages. This study also provided clues as to when and to what extent languages have converged or diverged.

Structural Similarities: Many structural features in T-B languages are typologically similar, and it is possible to make certain generalizations on the basis of comparative data. Hale (1970), for example, makes a phonological survey of seven Bodic languages of Nepal at levels of segmental phonemes, distinctive features and tone systems. One of his summaries on the vowel features may be quoted to show what the languages share in common:

Table 2. Distinctive vowel features in seven Bodic languages of Nepal, after Hale (1970)

	Sherpa	Gurung	Tamang	Thakali	Chepeng	Newari	Sunwar
Nasal	1	1	2	3	3	1	1
Breath	3	1	1	1	3	3	3
Length	3	3	1	3	3	1	1

1. Contrastive for all vowels
2. Rare, contrastive only for /e/ and /a/
3. Non-contrastive

Phonetic/Phonological Correspondences: The argument for phonetic or phonological correspondences in shared vocabulary can be seen quite convincingly in limited data:

English	Tibetan	Sherpa	Thakali	Limbu	Newari	Tamang
one	tsi?	tsikh	'Tih	thih	chi	kiih
two	ngi	ni	'ngih	netsti	nyi	nyih

A comparison of basic vocabulary to show sound resemblances has been made for several languages, and a few examples of similar words in Tibetan and Newari, respectively, follow: "outside", phi and pi; "eye", mig and mikha "die", shi and shi; "kill", sat and syat; "sun", nyi and nyibha; "fire", mi and mi. Such similarities are neither coincidental nor cultural loans.

Sound Systems: The core phonological segments of T-B include three voiceless stops (p,t,k) with aspirated and non-aspirated distinction, clear and breathy voiced stops (b,d,g) and three nasals (m,n,n̄). There are five continuant sounds (s,z,r,l, and h) and two semi-vowels (w,y). Three degrees of vowel opening have two members in each: i, u (high), e, o (mid) and a, a: (low). Length and nasal vowels also occur in varying phonemic or sub-phonemic functions.

Historically, two interesting claims have been made: one, the contrast in aspiration of initial stops is most likely the result of lost initial CC- cluster of Proto-T-B; and two, the loss of voicing contrast in initial and final consonants and consonant clusters led to the development of tones.

Tonality: Tibetan and several languages of the Himalayan group (Tamang, Thakali) have a lexical tone although tones are often related to breathiness, voicing and stress features. Lexical pitch is entirely non-contrastive for Newari and some Tibetan dialects.

Syllabicity: A vast majority of words in T-B languages are monosyllabic, a situation which resulted in the loss of initial consonant clusters and a system of affixes. This is true of contemporary Newari, but interestingly, Dolkhali Newari dialect spoken in Eastern Nepal shows several retentions in morphology (syllable-final consonants and older forms of verbal suffixes) and appears to be rather important for comparative studies.

Affixation: Most T-B languages have or had at one time a system of prefixes and suffixes attached to stem words. Benedict (1972: 96) characterized complex affixation as 'morphology of antiquity', and several Proto-T-B prefixes have been reconstructed: *s- (causative), *m- (intransitive), *b-, *d-, *g-, *r- and others in certain language divisions. In Newari, the alternation of voiced and voiceless initial consonant in 'suppletive causatives' (dane/thane; gyaye/khyaye) provide evidence of the loss of Proto-T-B prefix *s-. The same is true of suffixes where Proto- *s- (used with several types of nouns and verbs), *t and *-n have been posited for several T-B languages.

Vowel Alternations: The dominant pattern of verb morphology in T-B center on the vowel alternations around the stem. This is true of Lhasa Tibetan where verbs are differentiated in part by vowel alternations (tan ki jo

'send', tan ki ji 'shall send'), and in Newari the vowel changes involved in inflectional morphemes are predictable for all classes of verbs (won-a 'I went', won-a 'He went', won-e 'I will go', won-i 'He will go'). Other factors like accent or *sandhi* (influence of surrounding sound) have also been suggested as possible reasons for the T-B ablaut systems.

Word Classes: Some T-B languages appear not to make a clear distinction between verbs and nouns, or adjectives used as verbs. The main verb, always placed after all nouns, is marked for aspect and tense, while nominals can be pre-modified or post-modified depending on their relationship to verbs. In some languages (Newari, Gurung) nominals are marked for their function (ergative construction) but not marked as such in the verb. The notion of 'subject' and transitivity of verbs in ergative languages can best be seen as 'agent-goal' rather than a 'subject-object' system.

Noun Classifiers: In a number of modern T-B languages, nouns can be counted or modified by the use of classifiers in constructions such as 'one person man', 'one object book', 'one structure house', and so on. This phenomenon has received some attention in Newari, and is apparently absent in Tibetan but classifiers are not exclusively Sino-Tibetan; they exist also in Miao-Yao, Tai, Austric, and Japanese.

Word Order: The most common T-B word order is subject-object-verb, and modified-modifier, but this is not uniform within the family. In Newari, modifiers can take various forms (demonstrative, quantifier, possessive, phrase or single-word adjective) and usually precede the head noun. Verbal modifiers follow the main verb in both Tibetan and Newari. Newari verbs can also occur in a series (concatenation) with irreversible order (won-a: ka-ya hati 'go, take, come' to mean 'bring').

Writing Systems: The use of writing systems in T-B seems to be very restricted. Newari is one of four T-B languages with an old written tradition (the other three being Tibetan, Burmese and Manipuri) and the only member of the Himalayan group with such a tradition. The Tibetan and Newari scripts (Ranjana, Pracalit, Bhujimol) are variations of the Brahmi (Devanagari) alphabet of northern India which has its origin in the *Kutila* writing system invented in the 7th century A.D.

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POLYANDRY, ADAPTABILITY AND ENVIRONMENT: A CASE STUDY OF TANGIN, A HIMALAYAN VILLAGE IN NEPAL*

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Introduction

The present paper attempts to provide a picture of Himalayan polyandry on the basis of empirical information gathered during the course of a short field study. The study was conducted in Tangin, a village in Humla District, north-west Nepal.¹ It assumed the hypothesis that polyandry is an outcome of adaptability in the ecological setting of the Himalaya, and the present environmental degeneration and a growing tendency towards monogamous marriage have made people's adaptability to present conditions a matter of serious concern. This study explores how the ecosystem shaped the lives and culture of the Humli people, the ecological factors underlying the practice of polyandrous marriage in the Himalayan region of Nepal with reference to Humla, and the major causes of environmental degeneration and its consequences for adaptation and survival.

The Interplay Between Ecosystem and People

Nepal's northern border with Tibet is a high Himalayan region inhabited by Tibeto-Burman Mongoloid peoples scattered among rocky slopes and high river valleys. The various enclaves of Tibetan-speaking people in the north Nepal borderland are collectively referred to in Nepali as Bhote or Bhotiya (literally "Tibetans").

Humla is a remote, mountainous, extraordinarily rugged and secluded district on the border with Tibet. The ethnographic pattern of Humla is characterised by the close proximity of Tibetan-speaking Bhotiyas (who often refer to themselves as "Tamang") and Nepali-speaking Hindus, consisting

* This paper was presented in the International Seminar on "Anthropology of Tibet and the Himalayas" on September 21-28, 1990, at the Ethnographic Museum of the University of Zurich, in cooperation with the Swiss Directorate for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, Bern.

mainly of Thakuri and Chhetri castes. These populations are interspersed up to an altitude of about 10,000 ft., but the higher valleys are inhabited exclusively by Bhotiyas (Furer-Haimendorf 1971:99). The Humli Tamangs who dwell in the northern part are Buddhists who are similar to the Tibetans in culture and dialect. The Thakuri Chhetris and untouchables speak Nepali and are Hindus by religion.

Tangin is one day's walk from Simikot, the district headquarters of Humla. The village consists of two settlements an hour's walk apart. During the summer season the villagers go to a high altitude settlement in the lap of a high mountain known as Anjiluntar. In summer they descend to a settlement near the banks of the Tangin Karnali River. Both settlements are situated north of the river. On the south side of the Tangin Karnali, opposite the village, cultivable land is scarce, but there is ample forest which breaks the bitter wind.

The architecture of houses in the villages of this region is uniform, irrespective of the ethnic affiliation of the inhabitants. The style is one that prevails in much of northwest Nepal. Houses are built wall to wall in such a way that their flat roofs form large terraces, a feature made possible by the relatively low rainfall of the region. The clustered buildings cling to the slopes with each row of houses touching those below and above. The houses have many small rooms, an adaptation to severe cold. The ground floor accommodates cattle, while the different rooms of the first floor are used for cooking, storage and sleeping. The kitchen keeps the air warm inside. In spite of the smoke, family members prefer to sit around the hearth to protect themselves from severe cold. Consumption of firewood in Tangin is extremely high.

Directly above the upper settlement are green pastures that extend half way up the hill. Adaptability to the environment is reflected in the annual cycle of transhumance. From September to April the people inhabit the lower settlement near the Tangin Karnali, and from May to August they live at high altitude. They take their yaks, sheep, goats and a few cattle to the upland pastures, together with their tents, necessary food and cooking utensils.

To supplement their stocks of tsampa, wheat flour, buckwheat and butter, the villagers collect a small forest berry, called *dhatelo* in Nepali, from which they extract oil for cooking. Sheep's wool is used to make various types of mats and blankets known as *phingma*, *phere* and *liu*. Goat hair is used for making ropes and bags for loading grain and salt onto the backs of sheep, goats and yaks during trading excursions, as well as for larger domestic grain storage sacks.

The villagers are equipped against the cold climate with thick, warm clothing. They wear the Tibetan style garment called *bakkhu* in Nepali. Both men and women wear black and green *bakkhu*, woolen and cotton trouser, and tunics with silk or satin blouses underneath, woolen caps and sweaters, and strong hand-woven woolen shoes. Although kerosene is available, illumination is obtained by burning resinous splints cut from the trunks of pine trees.

The Tamangs of Tangin keep large number of livestock. Only one family remains to watch over the entire lower village while the others move to the high pastures. The herders shift from one pasture to another with their animals following a route that takes them as far as three or four-day walk from the upper village on the route towards Limi. During this season, many people go to Taklakot, a market on the Tibetan border, to trade their foodgrains and wood for Tibetan salt and wool. As winter encroaches, they gradually shift back down to the higher village, and then to the lower altitudes. During the winter the old and weak cattle are kept in the lower village, where hay is stored for cold and snowy days. Many of the Tamangs come down to the middle hills and inner valleys such as Achham, Surkhet and Bajura with their sheep and goats. The animals are loaded with salt and local products, such as blankets and honey, which are sold by the traders.

There is a small *gompa* (Tib. *dgon-pa*) just above Tangin, and the village has a small community of lamas and nuns (*jhuma* or *topeni*).² The villagers believe that their economy cannot flourish without the blessings and performances of the lamas. The presence of a lama is necessary in most social and religious activities, such as name-giving and head-shaving ceremonies, and marriages and funerals. Further more, lamas are required to perform rites to do away with evil spirits and prevent misfortune (such as hailstorms and adverse weather that might damage crops). In accordance with Tibetan custom the middle son of a household traditionally becomes a lama and the middle daughter a celibate nun.³

Polyandry and Adaptability: An Ecological Discussion: The ecological setting of Tangin is unfavourable for good agricultural production, with only one crop per year. Cultivated land is limited, rocky and infertile. In winter, all agricultural activities are suspended due to the heavy snowfall. The harsh environment makes survival difficult. Fraternal polyandry represents an adaptation to this environment, since it keeps joint families intact and avoids fragmentation of holdings. It enables a joint family of brothers to earn income from various sources and to pool their earnings.

Fraternal polyandry is a rare form of marriage that occurs in the northern regions of Nepal and India.⁴ There are two forms of marriage among the

Tamangs of Tangin, arranged and love marriage. The first is a simple affair. The brother and some of their relatives visit the prospective bride's house following a route fixed by a lama. The bride's family entertains them, and the wedding is solemnised by the lama's recitation of prayers. After two days the grooms' party returns home with the richly dressed and adorned bride. Feasting, singing and dancing accompanied by musical instruments frequently mark the celebrations.

Since the woman becomes the wife of all the brothers, widowhood is rare. Forty percent of marriages in Tangin were found to be arranged, while 60 percent were love marriages, indicating a freedom of choice in marriage and 42.5 percent of the families were polyandrous, whereas 57.5 percent were monogamous.

Generally, sexual rights to the wife are determined by age, so that the younger brothers are entitled to access only in the absence of their seniors. If all the brothers are at home, the younger ones have to take the chance of approaching their wife in the daytime in the fields or other hiding places.⁵ However, it was observed that in practice the division of labour provides them with sexual access in turns. Usually one brother will work as a herdsman, another as a trader and another with the wife in the fields or house. In such a social setup, the woman looks after all her husbands with equal favour, tact and ingenuity, without displaying preference. The skill with which she manages her role is crucial in maintaining family harmony and tranquility. Sometimes there is a great difference in age between a wife and her youngest husband. From childhood the youngest of several brothers develops the attitude that he is the potential or virtual husband of a wife signifies to him that he should exercise his privilege as a husband. She actively discourages the possibility that the youngest husband might marry another woman. However, there were said to have been many cases where the youngest brother in a polyandrous household had revolted and married separately because of the considerable difference in ages.⁶ Consequently the majority of families in Tangin are monogamous. But a brother who marries independently loses his right to the family property and he must begin life anew by securing public land or entering his wife's household.

Two marriages in Tangin involved sororal polygyny. There were ten unmarried women between the ages of fifteen and thirty-two. When interviewed, they all expressed themselves in favour of polyandrous marriage. Polyandry enables a set of brothers to obtain the fullest benefit of several sources of livelihood. One can cultivate the joint landholding, another breed livestock, a third engage in trade and so forth, and pool their earnings with their common wife.

The claim has been made that polyandry is the result of an excess of males over females, but my research in Tangin does not support this contention. As stated earlier, the population of men and women is exactly equal (104 of each sex in thirty-one households). The female population included six celibate nuns and the ten marriageable but unmarried women.

Ninety percent of the family heads, including the heads of the monogamous families, looked upon polyandry with favour. The respondents informed me that polyandry had always been practised in Tangin and neighbouring villages. Geo-cultural and historical reasons are also responsible for the presence of polyandry in Tangin. Economic factors, shaped by environmental requirements, are the most important basis for polyandry. The principal result of polyandrous marriages is that the inheritance of land and livestock is transmitted intact to a group of brothers in each generation.⁷ The subdivision and fragmentation of holdings would reduce the allotments of cultivable land into useless small tracts which provided insufficient food for the owners. Separate families would scarcely be able to maintain themselves on such divided and partitioned plots. Strenuous efforts have been made to bring every inch of land under cultivation in Tangin. However, agricultural production is still insufficient to meet the food grain requirements of local people, and animal husbandry, trade and cottage industry are important aspects of the local economy. In a typical family one brother is responsible for agricultural production, another takes charge of the herds and goes to the grazing grounds, while a third travels to Taklakot and the mid-hills for trading. The wives and sisters produce local goods such as carpets and wooden bowls (*phuru*: Tib. *phor-bu*). Thus one or two brothers in a family are absent from the village for long periods.

There are several illegitimate children, known as Thima (Nep. *batase santan*) in Tangin.⁸ As observed in the field area, many such girls become nuns. By and large the life of these nuns is miserable. Rather than being a result of too few women, polyandry seems to produce an excess of unmarried girls who are left uncared for and lead lives of real hardship and difficulty.

Monogamous Marriage, Environment Degeneration and Challenges for Survival

In the case of Tangin village, the interaction between people and their land and environment is so intense that one cannot be understood in isolation from the others. Ever since the earliest known times, the Tamangs of Tangin have been primarily an agro-pastoral group engaged in limited trade. The natural environment of Tangin is unsuitable for intense farming because of the rocky, infertile land and low rainfall. However, polyandrous domestic groups are better adapted to successful farming on the slopes of Tangin.

The range of domestic chores requires a collective effort and clear division of labour, which cannot be satisfied by monogamous families. Polyandry in Tangin is a response to the ecological demands of the region. But the tradition is being challenged by the younger generation. Ten boys between the ages of fifteen and eighteen stated during interviews that they felt uncomfortable about the custom and would not accept the aged wife of their eldest brother. Besides, increasing social contact with outsiders and new values concerning sexual relations have led to a growing tendency to abandon polyandry in favour of monogamous marriage. It is a matter of serious concern whether the gradual decline in polyandry will bring about a new and unexpected challenge to the local economy.

Tangin is economically backward, and alternative means of livelihood are not being introduced by any outside agencies. The forest is the source of firewood, timber, numerous medicinal plants and animal fodder. Cattle depend entirely upon the forest and grazing lands, but pastoral areas been declining every year, and severe deforestation has made the once green lands around Tangin naked and bleak. Monogamy has contributed to deforestation to the extent that increasingly large quantities of timber are required to build new houses, while each new house also represents another hearth in which fuelwood is consumed. The traditional system of inheritance is being replaced by the legal partitioning of land among the individual heirs in each generation.

The scarcity of arable land around Tangin poses additional problems, while forests are being cleared for cultivation by the villagers in accordance with their legal rights; herders regularly burn swathes of forest around Tangin during the summer. The environmental degradation of the Himalayas has created a crisis for survival.

With regard to the survival of people in this state of environmental degeneration in the Himalayas, the following questions have to be considered with special reference to Tangin:

1. How is it possible to overcome hardship in a community which is turning towards monogamy from polyandry, a form of marriage in which earnings of individuals are pooled?
2. What steps can be taken to save the Himalayan environment in the context of new values and pressures?
3. Should polyandry remain an obligatory tradition until new socioeconomic activities or plans are introduced?

In Tangin as in other Himalayan regions fraternal polyandry has prevailed for a long time because of economic factors which even now play a pivotal but changing role.

Notes

1. This survey was undertaken as part of a research project "Entitled education for Rural Development, Kailali-Karnali Baseline Survey", sponsored by UNESCO. The field investigation was carried out by the present researcher for a period of about one month in May, 1989. The Tangin village consists of 31 Tamang families, with a total population of 208: 104 males and 104 females. It is a homogeneous, isolated group in a remote area of the district.
2. *Jhuma* Tib. *jo-ma*: the term *topeni* is a composite of the Tibetan *grwa-pa* "monk", and the Nepali feminine suffix *-ni*.
3. This tradition should be distinguished from the custom of lineage priesthood, common in Nepal's Tibetan-speaking communities, in which the eldest son becomes the head of the household as a married lama. The institution of lineage priesthood in Tibetan-speaking communities has been described by numerous authors, including Paudel (1986), Aziz (1978: 76-94, 210 ff) and Rable (1985). A woman becomes a nun after a retreat of three years, three months and three days. The present researcher was prohibited from seeing a nun who was living alone inside a cottage in Tangin.
4. Although it was the traditional form of marriage in Tibet, polyandry is practised not only by the Tibeto-Burman people of the Himalayas, but also by the Indo-Aryans of Himachal Pradesh, India (see Majumdar 1962). Although monogamy is spreading, polyandry remains common in Western Nepal. It occurs widely among Tibetan-speaking communities of the northern hill of Nepal, as well as the so-called Gurungs of Gorkha and the people of Manang District.
5. The teacher of Tangin school speculated that the Tamangs have a lower sexual desire due to the severe cold of the area, since one wife is sufficient for them. The teachers themselves are from the Terai.
6. Sometime when the younger husband marries outside the polyandrous union, the elder wife complains about the fact to the government offices (see Sharma 1988). But if the wife initiates a divorce and marries another man, her ex-husbands receive compensation from the new husband. The amount is usually between Rs. 20,000 and Rs. 50,000. However, during the field visit, the researcher heard that a compensation of Rs. 65,000 had been paid in Baraunse village, near Simikot.
7. Other authors have remarked that the coherence of landholding was the principal reason for polyandry in Tibet. Majumdar has noted that polyandry in different parts of the Himalayas is attributed to geo-economic factors. Similarly, on the subject of polyandry in Central Tibet, Goldstein remarks that the "monomarital" marriage principle, in which only one (polyandrous) marriage might be contracted in a household in each generation, was 'motivated by the strong desire to prevent partition of the corporate unit with its lands' (1971: 68).

8. Illegitimacy presents government officials with a problem in the distribution of citizenship certificates, which technically cannot be issued to an individual who has no recognised father.

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RESEARCH NOTE

ETHNOBOTANICAL NOTE ON FOLK-LORE REMEDIES OF BAGLUNG DISTRICT, NEPAL

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INTRODUCTION

Traditional phytotherapy with herbal drugs plays an important role in the healthcare of the people in rural areas of Nepal. More than 90% of the population reside in the rural areas where developmental activities are insufficient. The Baglung district (28° 5'-28' N and 82° 45'-83° 36' E) is one of the 75 districts of Nepal which has an area 2153 km² with a population of 205,085. The elevation ranges from 1000-7244 m. The climate is sub-tropical, temperate and alpine. Baglung bazar, the district capital has annual average maximum temperature of 26.6° C. and minimum 19.1° C. The average annual rainfall recorded is 1060.9 ml (Aryal et al., 1982).

METHODOLOGY

Most traditional healers use medicinal plants though the religious practices and preaching of the supernatural are also in vogue in the folk healthcare. Only a few elders in the villages still remember the time when herbal medicine was extensively used. Many of them have forgotten the use of medicinal plants however, some still remember the medicinal uses of some of these plants.

The study was conducted during the pre-monsoon of 1991 and the post-monsoon 1992. In the course of the study, 7 villages like Phapharbari, Okhle, Lamela, Burtibang, Nwar, Righa and Galkot were surveyed, and 1-3 local healers and about 5 experienced villagers (about 40-60 yr.) were interviewed in each village. Priority was given to the native healers. Only those plants which had at least five positive answers from the informant at different localities, have been included here.

The use of herbal remedies usually in the form of infusion, decoction, juice and paste are taken for internal problems. The powder, juice and poultices are applied externally to the affected part. These drugs are the primary means of healthcare for general ailments (Manandhar, 1986a, b; 1987).

ENUMERATION

The plants that embody the information are arranged in alphabetical order of botanical name followed by family, Nepali name (N.), voucher number of the author and ultimately the medicinal uses of plants. These plants were identified by the author with the help of herbarium specimens, books and photographs. These plant specimens are housed in the National Herbarium and Plant Laboratories, Godawari, Lalitpur, Nepal.

Abelmoschus manihot (L.) Medik MALVACEAE; N. Bankapas; 877-91.

Juice of bark is put in the cuts and wounds; squeezed root is wrapped in a clean cloth and applied with light pressure to relieve sprain.

Adiantum caudatum L. ADIANTACEAE; N. Seto sinki; 606-92.

A decoction of plant, about 4 teaspoon 2 times a day, is given in case of gastric troubles.

Aesculus indica (Colebr. ex Cambess.) Hook. HIPPOCASTANACEAE; N. Pangar; 1000-91.

About 10-15 cotyledons are fed to cattle as an anthelmintic medicine.

Amaranthus spinosus L. AMARANTHACEAE; N. Lunde kanda; 895-92.

Root, is mixed in equal amount with *Centella asiatica* (L.) Urb. (N. Ghortapre), *Equisetum diffusum* D.Don (N. Kurkure) and root of *Circium verutum* (D.Don) Spreng. (N. Thakailo) is pounded and juice extracted, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day is suggested to treat urinal inflammation.

Ampelocissus divaricata (Wall. ex Lawson) Planch VITACEAE; N. Pureni; 908-91.

Juice of root is used to relieve snake-bite or scorpion-bite.

Anemone rivularis Buch.-Ham. ex DC. RANUNCULACEAE; N. Kangres jhar; 435-92.

Juice of leaf is applied to treat cuts and wounds.

Artemisia dubia Wall. ex Besser ASTERACEAE; N. Pati; 527-92.

Juice of plant, about 4 teaspoon 2 times a day, is suggested to relieve gastric troubles.

Artocarpus lakoocha Wal. MORACEAE; N. Barahar; 744-91.

Latex is applied to treat boils.

Asclepias curassavica L. ASCLEPIADACEAE; N. Machha phul; 613-92.

Latex is applied to treat wart.

Astilbe rivularis Buch.-Ham. ex D.Don SAXIFRAGACEAE; N. Bedango; Ganegurjo; 987-91.

Juice of plant is applied to relieve sprain and muscular swellings; a decoction of root, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is recommended in case of menstrual disorder.

Barleria cristata L. ACANTHACEAE; N. Bhare kuro, Lari phul; 883-91.
Juice of root, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day, is suggested in case of indigestion.

Begonia pecta Sm. BEGONIACEAE; N. Magar kanache; 973-91.

Juice of root, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is suggested in case of peptic ulcer.

Bistorta vacciniifolia (Wall. ex Meisn.) Greene POLYGONACEAE; N. Pulunge jhar; 461-92.

Juice of root, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day, is suggested to treat fever.

Boenninghausenia albiflora (Hook.) Reichenb. ex Meissn. RUTACEAE; N. Karna; 479-92.

Juice of plant is applied to treat scabies; it is poisonous to animals.

Boerhavia diffusa L. NYCTAGINACEAE; N. Sanu pate; 936-91.

Juice of plant is applied to treat backache.

Buddleja paniculata Wall. LOGANIACEAE; N. Bhimsenpati; 910-91.

Leaf, mixed in equal amount with the leaf of *Crotalaria alata* Buch.-Ham. ex D.Don (N. Chhimchhime) is boiled and the infusion, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is recommended to treat fever.

Caesalpinia decapetala (Roth) Alson FABACEAE; N. Ulte Kanda; 5173-92.

Juice of root is applied to treat sprain and muscular swellings of animals.

Callicarpa arborea Roxb. VERBENACEAE; N. Thulo guyenlo; 896-91.

Juice of bark, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day, is recommended in fever; ash of burnt leaf is applied to treat boils.

C. macrophylla Vahl VERBENACEAE; N. Dahichamle; 875-91.

Tender leaf bud; mixed with *Drumaria diandra* Bl. (N. Abijalo). *Oxalix corniculata* L. (N. Chariamilo) and *Cheilanthes albomarginata* C.B. Cl. (N. Dankerno) in equal amount is pounded and the juice, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in case of acidity and gastric troubles.

Calotropis gigantea (L.) Dryand. ASCLEPIADACEAE; N. Aank; 880-91.

Milky latex is applied to treat sprain.

Cannabis sativa L. CANNABACEAE; N. Ganja; 918-91.

Powder of dried leaf is fed to animals in case of cough and cold.

Centella asiatica (L.) Urb. APIACEAE; N. Tapre jhar; 609-92.

Juice of plant, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day, is suggested in case of fever.

Cheilanthes albomarginata C.B. Cl. PTERIDACEAE; N. Dankerno; 915-91.

Juice of plant, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day is suggested in case of gastric troubles.

C. bicolor (Forssk.) Kaulf. PTERIDACEAE; N. Dubini sinki, kali sinki; 605-92.

Juice of plant, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day, is suggested in case of gastric troubles.

Chenopodium album L. CENOPODIACEAE; N. Bethe; 611-92.

Powder of seed, about 4 teaspoon 4 times a day is given with hot water in case of gastric troubles; it is also useful to relieve the discharge of semen through the urine.

Cirsium verutum (D. Don) Spreng ASTERACEAE; N. Dhode kanda, Thotane kanda; 512-92.

Juice of root, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day is given in case of fever.

Clematis buchananiana DC. RANUNCULACEAE; N. Charchare; 977-91.

Juice of plant is applied to treat cuts and wounds; also this juice about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in case of indigestion.

Clinopodeium umbrosum (M. Bjeb.) C. Koch LAMIACEAE; N. Bilajor; 580-92.

Juice of leaf is applied to treat cuts and wounds.

Colebrokea oppositifolia Sm. LAMIACEAE; N. Bhogate; 929-91.

Juice of immature inflorescence, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is given in gastric troubles; juice of leaf, about 6 teaspoon during bed time is taken as an anthelmintic medicine and is also put inside the nose to treat sinusitis.

Corydalis chaerophylla DC. PAPAVERACEAE; N. Karme jhar, Pahlenle, Pile; 981-91.

Juice of plant, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in case of peptic ulcer; juice of root mixed in equal amount with the root juice of *Cyathula capitata* Moq. (N. Kuro), about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day is given in case of indigestion.

Costus speciosus (Koenig) Sm. ZINGIBERACEAE; N. Betlauri; 591-92.

Juice of root, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in case of urinal troubles.

Cynoglossum zeylanicum (Vahl) Thub. ex Lehm. BORAGINACEAE; N. Kanike Kuro; 898-91.

Root, mixed with the root of *Achyranthes bidentata* Bl. (N. Kuro) is boiled and the decoction, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is given to treat indigestion.

Desmodium heterocarpon (L.) DC. FABACEAE; N. Sakhino jhar; 902-91.

Juice of root, about 4 teaspoon 4 times a day is given in case of fever.

Dicentra scandens (D. Don) Walp. PAPAVERACEAE; N. Chhotang, Jogi lahara, Sano pahenli; 923-91.

Plant is fed to animals as an anthelmintic medicine; juice of plant, about 4 teaspoon 4 times a day, is given to treat fever; juice of root is applied to treat wounds between the toes caused by constant walking barefooted in muddy water during rainy season.

Dichroa febrifuga Lour HYDRANGIACEA; N. Basuli; 991-91.

Juice of leaf, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day is given in case of malaria fever.

Drymaria diandra Bl. CARYOPHYLLACEAE; N. Abijalo; 905-91.

Plant, mixed with *Oxalis corniculata* L. (N. Chariamilo) and *Cheilanthes albomarginata* C.B.Cl. (N. Dankerno) in equal amount is pounded and the juice, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is given to treat gastric troubles; juice of root is inhaled to relieve sinusitis.

D. villosa Cham. & Schlecht. CARYOPHYLLACEAE; N. Abijalo; 992-91.

Juice of plant, about 8 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given to treat gastric troubles

Eclipta prostrata (L.) L. ASTERACEAE; N. Bhiringi jhar; 939-91.

Juice of plant is applied to treat wounds.

Elatostema integrifolium (D. Don) Wedd. URTICACEAE; N. Lipe jhar; 892-91.

Juice of root, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in case of fever.

Elephantopus scaber L. ASTERACEAE; N. Bhere kuro, Bhiringi jhar; 894-91.

Juice of plant is applied to treat wounds; juice of root, about 2 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in case of indigestion.

Euphorbia hirta L. EUPHORBIACEAE; N. Dudhe jhar; 988-91.

Juice of plant is applied to treat cuts and wounds.

E. royleana Boiss EUPHORBIACEAE; N. Syuri, 533-92.

About 10 gm of pith, roasted in fire and is taken 2 times a day in case of gastric troubles.

E. milii Desmoul. EUPHORBIACEAE; N. Simri; 949-91.

Latease is applied to treat sprain.

F. hispida L. f. MORACEAE; N. Tote; 572-92.

Juice of root, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day is given in case of fever.

F. semicordata Buch-Ham. ex Sm. MORACEAE; N. Khanyu; 916-91.

Bark, mixed in equal amount with the bark of *Schima wallichii* (DC.) Korth. (N. Chilaune), *Syzygium cumini* (L.) Skeels (N. Jamuna). *Phyllanthus emblica* L. (N. Amala) and *mangifera indica* L. (N. Aanp) is

pounded and the juice, about 6 teaspoon 4 times a day is given in case of gastric troubles and peptic ulcer.

Fragaria daltoniana J. Gay ROSACEAE; N. Karna phule jhar; 480-92.

Juice of root, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day is given to treat fever.

Galium aparine L. RUBIACEAE; N. Kangre jhar; 455-92.

Juice of plant is applied to treat cuts and wounds.

G. hirtiflorum Requien ex DC. RUBIACEAE; N. Lute jhar; 933-91.

Paste of plant is applied to treat scabies.

Gonostegia hirta (Bl.) Miq. URTICACEAE; N. Chiple lahari; 919-91.

Juice of root, about 6 teaspoon at interval of 4 hrs. is given to treat typhoid; paste of root is applied to relieve muscular swellings.

Hemiphragma heterophyllum Wall. SCROPHULARIACEAE; N. Nash jhar; 492-92.

Juice of plant is applied to relieve cuts and wounds.

Homalium napaulense (DC.) Benth. FLACOURTIACEAE; N. Kuphre; 561-92.

Juice of bark, about 2 teaspoon 3 times a day is given in case of stomachache.

Hydrocotyle himalaica P.K. Mukherjee APIACEAE; N. Seto tapre; 967-91.

Juice of plant, about 3 teaspoon 3 times a day is given in case of indigestion.

H. sibthorpioides Lam. APIACEAE; N. Sano tapre; 985-91.

Plant, mixed in equal amount with the bark of *Callicarpa macrophylla* Vahl (N. Dahichawanle) and root of *Urtica dioica* L. (N. Sisnu) is boiled and the infusion, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is given to relieve fever.

Hymenopogon parasiticus Wall RUBIACEAE; N. Biri; 985-91.

Paste of fruit is used to brush teeth to protect from decaying.

Imperata cylindrica (L.) Beauv. POACEAE; N. Siru; 576-92.

Juice of root about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given to treat gastric troubles.

Jasminum multiflorum (Brum. f.) Andrews OLEACEAE; N. Jai; 590-92.

Paste of fruit is applied to treat wounds between the toes caused by walking barefooted in muddy water during rainy season.

Jatropha curas L. EUPHORBIACEAE; N. Sajiyon; 889-91.

Latex is applied to treat boils and pimples.

Justicia adhatoda L. ACANTHACEAE; N. Asuro; 920-91.

Juice of leaf is applied to treat jointache during fever.

Laggera alata (D. Don) Sch. Bip. ex Oliver ASTERACEAE; N. Eklebir; 948-91.

Paste of root is applied on boils.

Lecathus peduncularis (Royle) Wedd. URTICACEAE; N. Gakaleti; 941-91.

Plant, mixed in equal amount with the bark of *Saurauia napaulensis* DC. (N. Gogan) is pounded and the juice about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in fever.

Lindenbergia indica (L.) Vatake SCROPHULARIACEAE; N. Chharuwa jhar; 995-91.

Paste of plant is applied to treat boils.

Lyonia ovalifolia (wall.) Drude ERICACEAE; N. Angeri; 981-91.

Juice of leaf is applied to relieve itching.

Mahonia napaulensis DC. BERBERIDACEAE; N. Mandre chutro; 975-91.

Juice of bark boiled, cooled and put inside the eye to treat cataract.

Mangifera indica L. ANACARDIACEAE; N. Aanp; 912-91.

Juice of bark, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day is given in peptic ulcer.

Marsdenia roylei Wight ASCLEPIADACEAE; N. Dudhe lahara; 599-92.

Juice of stem, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in gastric troubles and peptic ulcer.

Mazus surculosus D. Don SCROPHULARIACEAE; N. Tapre jhar; 453-92.

Juice of plant is applied to treat cuts and wounds.

Mirabilis jalapa L. NYCTAGINACEAE; N. Malati; 521-92.

Juice of root, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is given in case of fever; it is also given in case of discharge of semen through the urine.

Morus serrata Roxb. MORACEAE; N. Kalo kaphal; 917-91.

Juice of root, about 6 teaspoon during bed time is taken as an anthelmintic medicine.

Myrica esculenta Buch.-Ham. ex D. Don MYRICACEAE; N. Kaphal; 536-92.

Juice of bark is applied to treat bodyache.

Nepeta leucophylla Benth. LAMIACEAE; N. Kankarne; 926-91.

Juice of root, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in fever.

Nicandra physaloides (L.) Gaertn. SOLANACEAE; N. Ismgoli; 801-91.

About 2 teaspoon of seeds, mixed with about 10 seeds of *Trigonella foenum graecum* L. (N. Methi) are boiled and about 6 teaspoon of juice 2 times a day, is given in fever.

Onychium siliculosum (Desv.) C. Chr. PTERIDACEAE; N. Kangio sostar; 906-91.

Juice of rhizome, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day is given in fever.

Oreocnide frutescens (Thunb.) Miq. URTICACEAE; N. Nite; 436-92.

Paste of leaf is applied to treat boils.

Osyris wightiana Wall. ex Wight SANTALACEAE; N. Bakhre khursani; 945-91.

Juice of bark, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in indigestion; paste of bark is applied to treat sprain.

Oxalis corniculata L. OXALIDACEAE; N. Chariamilo; 570-92.

Plant, mixed in equal amount with the leaf bud of *Justicia adhatoda* L. (N. Asuro) and *Maesa macrophylla* (Wall.) A DC. (N. Bhogate), is pounded and the juice about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in gastric troubles.

Pinus roxburghii Sarg. PINACEAE; N. Salla; 526-92.

About a pea sized resin 6 times a day is taken in case of gastric troubles.

Paris formosa (Wall.) D. Don ERICACEAE; N. Pore; 441-92.

Juice of leaf is applied to treat scabies.

Pleione praecox (Sm.) D. Don ORCHIDACEAE; N. Lasun pate; 984-91.

Paste of pseudobulb is applied to treat wounds.

Pleurospermum hookeri C.B. Cl. APIACEAE; N. Bhuset; 983-91

Juice of root, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in diarrhoea.

Pluemeria rubra L. APOCYNACEAE; N. Galainchi; 934-91.

Latex is put to take out any worms inside the wounds.

Pratia nummularia (Lam.) A. Br. & Aschers. CAMAPANULACEAE; N. Malagiri; 971-91.

Paste of fruit is applied to treat cuts and wounds.

Prunus cerasoides D. Don ROSACEAE; N. Paiyun; 961-91.

Juice of bark is applied to treat bodyache.

P. persica (L.) Batsch ROSACEAE; N. Aaru; 598-92.

Juice of leaf is put to take out any worms inside the wounds of an animal.

Reinwardtia indica Dudmort. LINACEAE; N. Pyaunli; 935-91.

Juice of leaf is applied to treat boils.

Rubus ellipticus J.E. Sm. ROSACEAE; N. Ainselu; 911-91.

Leaf bud, mixed in equal amount with the leaf bud of *Pinus roxburghii* Sargent (N. Salla), root of *Sosnchus wightianus* DC. (N. Mulapate), plant of *Centella asiatica* (L.) Urb. (N. Ghortapre) and plant of *Cynodon dactylon* (L.) Pers. (N. Dubo) is pounded and the juice, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day is given in peptic ulcer.

Rumex nepalensis Spreng. POLYGONACEAE; N. Halhale; 997-91.

Juice of root, about 4 teaspoon 2 times a day is given in case of cough and cold.

Schima walichii (DC.) Korth. THEACEAE; N. Chilaune; 921-91.

Juice of bark is fed to animals as an anthelmintic medicine.

Scutellaria discolor Colebr. LAMIACEAE; N. Ratapate; 884-91.

Juice of root, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day is given in gastric troubles.

S. scandens Buch.-Ham. ex D.Don LAMIACEAE; N. Kankarne; 571-92.

Juice of plant is applied to treat cuts and wounds; also put inside the ear to treat earache.

Semecarpus anacardium L.f. ANACARDIACEAE; N. Bhalayo; 587-92.

Latex is applied to treat scabies.

Senecio cappa Buch.-Ham. ex D.Don ASTERACEAE; N. Bakhre kane; 475-92.

Juice of root, about 4 teaspoon 3 times a day is given to treat fever.

Solanum nigrum L. SOLANACEAE; N. Kamari; 969-91.

Paste of seed is applied on forehead in case of headache.

S. surattense Brum. f. SOLANACEAE; N. Kantakari; 900-91.

Dried powder of seed is smoked to treat dental carries.

Sonchus wightianus DC. ASTERACEAE; N. Mulapate; 577-92.

Juice of root, about 6 teaspoon 3 times a day, is given in case of fever during cough and cold.

Stellaria vestita Kurz CARYOPHYLLACEAE; N. Karna phule jhar; 454-92.

Juice of plant is applied to treat cuts and wounds.

Stephania glandulifera Miers. MENISPERMACEAE; N. Gajur gano; 834-91.

Juice of root is applied in case of sprain and muscular swelling.

S. glauca (Roxb.) Miers MENISPERMACEAE; N. Batulpate; 529-92.

Root, mixed in equal amount with the bark of *Maesa macrophylla* (Wall.) A. DC. (N. Bhogate) is boiled and the decoction, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is suggested in case of peptic ulcer.

Swertia nervosa (G. Don) C.B. Cl. GENTIANACEAE; N. Tite; 944-91.

Plant is boiled with water and the juice about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is given in malaria fever.

Taxillus vestitus (Wall.) Denser LORANTHACEAE; N. Liso; 972-91.

Plant is boiled with water, decanted and boiled again to prepare a gelitaneous liquid, is applied in case of sprain and muscula swellings.

Terminalia alata Heyne ex Roth COMBRETACEAE; N. Saj; 544-92.

Juice of bark, boiled and applied to remove dandruff.

Tetragium serrulatum (Roxb.) Planch. VITACEAE; N. Pani lahara; 557-92.

Juice of plant, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day is given in fever.

Trichilia connaroides (Wight & Arn.) Bentvelzen MELIACEAE; N. Aankhatore; 544-92.

Oil from the seed is applied in case of boils and pimples.

Urena lobata L. MALVACEAE; N. Bhare jhar; 903-91.

Juice of root is applied in case of bodyache.

Vitex negundo L. VERBENACEAE; N. Sinwali; 890-91.

Juice of leaf, soaked in a piece of clean cloth, is inhaled to treat sinusitis.

Woodfordia fruticosa (L.) Kurz LYTHRACEAE; N. Dhayaro; 893-91.

Juice of leaf bud, mixed in equal amount with the juice of leaf buds of *Justicia adhatoda* L. (N. Asuro) and *Maesa macrophylla* (Wall.) A. DC. (N. Bhogate) is given, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day in case of gastric troubles.

Zizyphus mauritiana Lam. RHAMNACEAE; N. Bayar; 568-92.

Juice of root, about 4 teaspoon 2 times a day is given in indigestion; juice of leaf bud, about 6 teaspoon 2 times a day, is given in peptic ulcer; paste of fruit seed is applied to treat ringworm.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The native medicines and treatments are an oral tradition. Thus the possibilities exist for distortion or misrepresentation of the actual plant or the methods of treatment.

The study revealed 107 species of plants from 95 genera and 58 families. Out of these 2 families of Monocotyledons denotes 2 species. There is only one species from the family Pinaceae which represents Gymnosperm and two

species are represented by Pteridophyte. The rest of the plants comes from Dictyledons.

This inventory identifies 27 types of diseases from this area for which these plants are in vogue. Maximum number of 19 species are in common use for fever and 15 species for gastric troubles. Mostly single plant or its part is used for healing purposes. About 15 species were suggested in admixture. The medicinal uses of some species like *Centella asiatica*, *Cirsium vertum*, *Dichroa febrifuga*, *Euphorbia hirta*, *Hydrocotyle sibthorpioides*, *Justicia adhatoda*, *Mahonia napaulensis*, *Solanum nigrum* and *S. surattense* recorded from this area, are also noted from other parts or other tribal groups of the country (Coburn, 1984; Gurung 1986; Manandhar; 1989a, b; 1990a, b; 1991; 1992). The report of about 80% of plants is accumulated for the first time from this area and they either differ in the use of parts of plants or in the treatment of diseases.

In most cases the treatments may be effective, many more may be harmless and have no side effects while a small number may be dangerous too. It awaits scientific analysis of such folklore data. Nevertheless, more than 90% of the population have little access to modern treatment and they have to struggle with diseases adopting native medicine.

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BILATERALISM UNDER THE SHADOW: THE PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES IN NEPAL-BHUTAN RELATIONS

Lok Raj Baral

Formally, Nepal and Bhutan established diplomatic relation in 1983. Such a move was presumably prompted by the enthusiasm and calculation with which the South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) scheme was being given a formal shape following the proposal made by Ziaur Rahman, then President of Bangladesh. In 1985 the first South Asian summit accepted it, turning SARC into an association – South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). However, the two Himalayan Kingdoms, Nepal and Bhutan, were not new nations to the south of the Himalayas, as their civilizational links were more deep-rooted than political and other interactions. Even for knowledgeable scholars of the South Asian region, the close cultural and economic relations between them remained uniformed until Bhutan was thrown into the recent ethnic conflict generated by the alleged discriminatory policy – implementation of the Bhutanese State against the “southern Bhutanese” or the people of Nepali origin.

Now this small Himalayan Kingdom, almost entirely isolated from the rest of the outside world until quite recently, has suddenly come to the limelight. It is drawing the concerns of a large number of international agencies over human rights and democracy, despite the Bhutanese effort at presenting its own version of the issue – i.e. the Nepali minority in Bhutan is out to capture power by raising the bogey of discrimination, democracy and human rights. The coercive measures applied by the Bhutanese seemed to have been guided by an extreme sense of insecurity for both national identity and state security. In the perceptions of the Bhutanese elites, comprising basically the central elites around the king, these are being threatened by a demographic imbalance within the country. To thwart this perceived danger to many Bhutanese Nepalis, the royal government of Bhutan has imposed the compulsory dress and language of Tibetan origin of the minority 16% of the country onto the Nepali majority. The Nepalis resisted this and other laws relating to citizenship, thereupon the government, making the issue into one

of survival, implemented its policies of "Bhutanization", forcing the Nepalis to flee the country. Most of those who fled, whether voluntarily or due to coercion, found their way into Nepal, after having been encouraged to go there by the Indian authorities manning the North Bengal corridor between Bhutan and Nepal. About 85,000 refugees currently reside in the camps inside Nepal and a few thousands more in India.

Historical Background

Historically, Nepal's cultural and political relations with Bhutan were established long before the unification of Nepal in 1768. The Gorkha kings, the Mallas of the Kathmandu valley and the kingdoms of Mustang and Vijaypur of western and eastern Nepal had close relations with Bhutan. The main reason for these relations were religious, strategic and socioeconomic. The Kingdom of Gorkha had developed such relations, particularly during the reign of King Ram Shah. Later, it was said that Ram Shah solicited the help of the king of Bhutan in a request to send a Lama for performing certain rituals that could enable the queen to give birth to a child of their choice.¹

Some historical references have also been made that the Shah kings of Gorkha and also the rulers of "greater Nepal" following the unification had been able to garner Bhutanese support during their wars with Tibet (*Bhot*), for which the Bhutanese side was rewarded either by land grants or monasteries. From today's point of view the previous Bhutanese support for the rulers of Gorkha or greater Nepal against Tibet is incredible, because of close religious and cultural links between Tibet and Bhutan. However, the *realpolitik* seemed to prompt Bhutan to lend such support to Nepal.

The close bilateral relations paved the way for the movement of trained manpower. The Nepalis helped Bhutan to organize its administration and army and provided assistance to improve its agriculture, livestock, trade and commerce. Some sources have stated that the Nepalis committed themselves to protecting the Kingdom of Bhutan by identifying themselves with the fate of that country.² Later, the other Nepalis found the southern part of Bhutan as their place of settlement. People faced with difficult conditions in the Nepal hills migrated to Assam, Darjeeling, Sikkim of India, and Bhutan in search of better opportunities. Despite these historical and human links, there was very little economic interaction between Nepal and Bhutan, a trend that continues even today.

Since Nepal and Bhutan share no common border and are separated by India, their low economic links are understandable. Why the Nepal-Bhutan bilateral relations had been inactive and cool even after the overthrow of the 104-year-old Rana family rule in Nepal remains an enigma. The cooling of relations began soon after the Nepal-Tibet War of 1855-56, because Bhutan

took no interest in helping Nepal during the war. Perhaps its cultural and religious ties with Tibet overrode the strategic links between it and Nepal. It has been said that there have been no direct relations between Bhutan and Nepal since the Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty of January 10, 1910, which made Bhutan's external relations a direct concern of the Government of India.³

A country with whom Nepal had so much interaction in the past could seldom take any decision to upgrading the level of relations, let alone the exchange of visits between the two heads of state and government. Did the Bhutanese king choose a deliberate policy of distancing himself from yet another monarchical country? Or were there other compulsions to do? The creation of the Bhutan State Congress (BSC) in the wake of Nepal's democratic upsurge in the early 1950s, and the alleged encouragement given to the BSC by the Nepali side, could be one reason. The BSC was perceived as a threat to the absolute monarchy even though the party could hardly mount any decisive anti-regime movement since its birth. In 1964, some Bhutanese involved in an attempted coup d'état assassinating Prime Minister Jigme Palde Dorji were given political asylum in Nepal. "In any case the Nepalese action hurt Bhutanese susceptibilities," despite the subsequent amnesty granted to most of the fugitives by the king of Bhutan.⁴

Recent Refugee Movement and Nepal-Bhutan Relations

Refugee conditions are generally created by structural violence or repression or by some other "push" factors attributed to nature or society or both. Yet normally, "violence is the cause of refugees and the source of it can be state and society".⁵ It can also be correlated with severe ethnic conflict working as it does in causing migration, though not just migration alone as the refugees are not primarily produced by what Weiner calls "access and differential variables" or "pull" factors changing demographic settings.⁶ There has been a reverse wave of migration of the Bhutanese of Nepali origin – known as *Lhotshampa* – following the royal Bhutanese government's decision to intensify the campaign of 'one people, one nation' imposing the language of Tibetan origin – *Dzongkha* – and the dress of *Ngalung Drukpas*. A more important cause of the developing conflict between the southern Bhutanese (Nepalis) and the Drukpa-dominated elite group was "the implementation of the 1985 Citizenship Act which adopts 1958 as the cut-off year. In the implementation of the Act, the Royal Government has made it mandatory for every Bhutanese of Nepali ethnicity (sic) to produce 1958 land tax receipts to qualify for Bhutanese citizenship", knowing well that no villagers could preserve such records for 30 years.⁷ The process of Drukpanization seemed to have been precipitated by elite consternation at *Lhotschampa's* penchant for the Nepali language and culture, which in their perception would eventually

see the extinction of the *Driglam Namzha*, a traditional dress and etiquette that "dates from the time of the early Shabdruns of Bhutan."

The 1958 citizenship arrangement contained the following elements for recognition as Bhutanese citizens:

Any person was eligible for a national status

- (a) if his/her father was a Bhutanese national and was a resident of Bhutan; or
- (b) if any person was born within or outside Bhutan after the commencement of this law, provided the previous father was a Bhutanese national at the time of his/her birth.
- (c) if any foreigner who had the age of majority and was otherwise eligible, he could be granted citizenship after administering the oath of loyalty according to the rules laid down by an official, provided that:
 - (i) the person was a resident of Bhutan for more than ten years, and
 - (ii) owned agricultural land within the Kingdom.
- (d) a woman married to a Bhutanese national was granted citizenship after taking oath as laid down by law;
- (e) If any foreigner submitted a petition to the king expressing his eligibility on the grounds of age and other requirements, had served satisfactorily in government for at least five years, and had been residing in Bhutan for at least 10 years, he might receive the citizenship certificate.

This provision was amended in 1977, making 15 years of service and residing 20 years in Bhutan. Making language as one of the mandatory conditions, the 1977 Citizenship Act demanded allegiance to the king, country and people. According to an Amnesty International Report, during 1988 several thousand non-nationals were reportedly ordered to leave the country as landless or unemployed illegal immigrants or for overstaying initial permits, as part of a longer-term policy to limit the role of the non-national wage labour force. Linking to the possible impact of the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) movement across the Indo-Bhutanese border, the citizenship policy was "apparently implemented" vigorously. In the late 1980s, a committee for determining the proof of citizenship categorized people as

- (a) genuine Bhutanese citizens
- (b) returned migrant people who had left Bhutan and then returned
- (c) drop-out cases

- (d) a non-national woman married to a Bhutanese man
- (e) a non-national man married to a Bhutanese woman
- (f) adoption cases
- (g) non-nationals, i.e. migrants and illegal settlers

The recent Bhutanese conflict originates from the elites' vulnerability and fears that the Drukpa traditions and customs which are of Tibetan origin would be subordinated to the culture and religion (Hindu) of a Lhotshampa-dominated society. The imposition of *Dzongkha* as the only language and the *kira* (a dress for women) and *gho* (dress for men) in addition to the use of the 1958 Citizenship Act and their vigorous implementation made the people paranoid. In 1991, explaining the *raison d'être* of the official policy of regularizing citizenship for the promotion of national identity, the royal government of Bhutan declared:

...The Royal Government will never compromise when it comes to ensuring Bhutan's long-term security and integrity. The terrorists movement threatens the very sovereignty and integrity of Bhutan and its survival as a nation. Therefore, the policy on immigration and census and Citizenship Act of 1985 will have to be implemented in full. Nor can the royal government afford to discontinue the policy of national integration and the concept of one nation and one people. These policies are vital for ensuring Bhutan's long-term security and well being as a united and cohesive nation. That is why the Royal Government considers it so crucial for all citizens to look upon themselves as Bhutanese regardless of their race or religion, and why it so important for all citizens to take pride in being fraternal members of the united Bhutanese family.⁸

The marriage clause could be valid if marriage between a woman and a man or vice versa took place before 1985. Threatened by the cultures (both political and traditional social values) and by the increase of a minority that eventually turned out to be majority, the Bhutanese authorities decided to "counter" such threats by a "well planned programme of depopulation." "The rulers know the world well. They are astute and use every available advantage: the remoteness of their country, manipulable media, the weakness of all outsiders for 'last remaining Shangri-Las' and the blessings of giant southern neighbour that obligingly turns a blind eye."⁹ Whether or not the southern Bhutanese started fleeing the country in order to escape repression, Nepal became the ultimate destination for them as only small fraction of

refugee population from Bhutan is now residing in Indian state of West Bengal and Assam, while the number of refugees in Jhapa and Morang districts of Nepal reached 85,000.

Although conflicting versions are in circulation concerning the causes of the refugee conditions, the southerners (Lhotshampa) who are residing in Nepal as exiles say that the present crisis is the reflection of a policy which "is intended to mould a single Bhutanese cultural identity (in which their own culture has no place) and protect the interest of the northern *Drukpa* elite against a worldwide trend toward democratization." Corroborating the policy of "Depopulation," the educated southern Bhutanese maintain that the Bhutanese government is bent on evicting 100,000 Bhutan Nepalis with a view to balancing the demographic equation."¹⁰ The government, on the other hand, claims that most of people fleeing the country were illegal immigrants whose presence was detected by a census operation in 1988.

It has been said that Bhutan's fertile and lightly populated low-lands, free education and medicine, the porosity of the borders along with the social and economic pressure in Nepal encouraged the immigration. In the Bhutanese version, "what was a manageable ethnic minority during the first half of the century, has turned into a large community which considers itself as a part of the Nepalese diaspora with a different cultural background and little allegiance to the Thimpu regime."¹¹

The regime believes that Bhutan has become the victim of a terrorist movement led by the Bhutan People's party, a Lhotshampa-dominated organization formed in 1990, which the government says is coercing southern Bhutanese into leaving the country in huge number in order to "internationalize the issue granting of wide ranging political demands."¹²

Human Rights Issue

Now the Bhutanese conflict has assumed both national and international dimensions because of the alleged violation of human rights by the royal government whose accountability and legitimacy before the world community is nil. Despite its adroit propaganda that the minority was out to capture power by raising the bogey of bad human rights record of Bhutan and the discriminatory policy of the government forcing the Lhotshampas to join the refugee camps in Nepal and India, the Sangrila-la image is being eroded. And the main villain behind such an erosion is obviously the case of the Bhutanese Nepalis or *Lhotshampas* whose representation has had been made by the BSC since 1952. Now other parties are also in the picture despite the internecine inter-party conflicts between the two groups – The Bhutan Peoples' Party and The Bhutan National Democratic Party. The organization of BSC and the demonstration it staged in 1954, and the demands made by

the new parties for redressing the complaints of the aggrieved community – *Lhotshampas* – have had enough grounds for sowing mutual distrust between Bhutan and Nepal.

In the context of the influx of Bhutanese refugees and the violation of human rights by the royal government, the official Bhutanese position is somewhat characterized by a sense of paranoia by trying to link the domestic ethnic problem with the alleged support of the present Nepali Congress government for the anti-regime movement in Bhutan. Although the predecessor of the present king had introduced some reforms in his absolute regime, the 1958 Citizenship Act which “empowered” the local officials to grant citizenship certificates gave rise to internal problem. Despite an improvement in the representation pattern having 16 *Lhotshampa* representatives in the 158 member National Assembly and one representative for the 10 member Royal Advisory Council and one judge in six member High Court. In addition, according to the official version, by 1990, 39% of all Bhutanese civil servants were *Lhotshampas* but by July 1992, 475 of them had fled the country.”¹³

The flight of trained manpower and their joining the movement against the regime is likely to be more costly for the regime. Branding them as traitors and “anti-nationals”, a common vocabulary used by the royal regime in Nepal for stigmatizing its enemy – the Nepali Congress – in the 1960s and 70s, the royal Bhutanese government is being accused of adopting a policy of “ethnic cleansing.” Prior to the intensification of the present crisis, some members of the National Assembly and Royal Advisory Council had drawn the attention of the king of the “classification of people as nationals, non-nationals, and people without status” based on incomplete documentation and hearsay.”. Instead, making them as security problem, the government, calling them anti-national, went on a repressive spree. One of the royal advisors, Tek Nath Rizal, was expelled from the Council for inciting people and spreading false propaganda against the royal government. After fleeing the country, Rizal continued his human rights campaigns in various forms including the distribution of pamphlets, activities which the royal government called “seditious.” Later, Rizal and his two colleagues were arrested in Nepal on November 15, 1989, and “handed over to the Bhutanese authorities the next day.” The Amnesty International has since adopted Rizal and other six southern Bhutanese as prisoners of conscience. In 1990, demonstrations were organized in southern parts of the country turning ethnic conflict into a full scale movement for democratizing the Bhutanese power structure. The successful anti-regime movement in Nepal in 1990 was also an immediate impetus to the Bhutanese dissidents living in exile in India and Nepal.

The relations between Bhutan and Nepal were further strained by the swelling refugee population and the organization of parties whose objective is not only to create conditions for the safe repatriation of Bhutanese refugees residing in camps in Nepal and in India, but also to introduce democratic reforms that are likely to change the power structure in Bhutan. Thus, showing his assertive postures, King Jigme Singye Wanchhuk said that all those in the refugee camps in Nepal are not Bhutanese nationals, as many people from India are also joining as refugees due to the attraction of money distributed by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNCHCR). Following the breakdown of the talks between the king of Bhutan and the prime minister of Nepal during the Seventh SAARC Summit in Dhaka in April 1993, senior government officials of Bhutan, as the official paper, the *Kuensel*-states, are "convinced that the position adopted by Prime Minister Koirala in Dhaka clearly indicates his support for the objective of the dissident groups to congregate as many ethnic Nepalese as possible in the camps in Nepal to mobilize international sympathy and support. Senior Bhutanese officials point out that the role played by Prime Minister Koirala in establishing the BSC in the 1950s has now assumed great significance."¹⁴

The initial remarks made by Prime Minister G.P. Koirala on the Bhutanese refugee problem and its background have not been taken positively by the Bhutanese side. Koirala's comment and the reactions that appeared in the Nepali press are interpreted as an act of abetment to the Bhutanese fugitives. Some points that have had stultified the process of negotiation were more related to the status of refugees, repatriation process and nature of negotiation. Rejecting the Nepali demand that the people residing in the refugee camps be treated as refugees, the Bhutanese side maintained that only the joint committee set up by the two sides could determine the genuineness of Bhutanese nationals in the camps while the Nepali side wanted to call them refugees awaiting safe return to their country. Later, obviously piqued by the sudden change of attitude of Bhutanese authorities on the issue of a ministerial committee, Koirala said that "Nepal should now ask the world community to help it cope with the burden imposed on it by the influx of Bhutanese refugees."¹⁵

Another issue appears to be more psychological having long-term and deep-rooted implications for the existing regime in Bhutan. The foreign minister of Bhutan, Lyonpo Dawa Tsering, is of the view that by bringing as many ethnic Nepalese as possible to the camps in Nepal and projecting them as Bhutanese refugees, the dissident groups are calculating on mobilizing international opinion against Bhutan and returning what he says

"in triumph with over a hundred thousand ethnic Nepalese to achieve their objective of turning Bhutan into a Nepali dominated state."¹⁶

Third, the issue of internationalization of refugee problem seems to be attracting the attention of both Bhutanese authorities and the Nepali intelligentsia, though both sides have juxtaposed concerns. The All Party meeting in Nepal has reached a consensus on a three-pronged strategy to the issue: settlement of problem through bilateral negotiations or quiet diplomacy, mediation of India if the first option failed; and the internationalization of the issue in case both the options proved inconsequential. Prime Minister Koirala, by way clarification, stated that internationalizing the issue did not mean anything other than seeking external assistance for feeding the refugees and their proper management. However, the Bhutanese foreign minister was quick to respond to Koirala saying that Nepal was not interested in settling the issue, as it was preparing to internationalize it.

Despite such standoffish approaches of the two sides, recent developments are sending some positive signals for constituting a joint ministerial committee in order to determine the status of refugees.¹⁷

Fourth, Nepal's "open door policy" allowing all people to cross the border had, in the Bhutanese version, complicated the situation. The Bhutanese king had reportedly advised Prime Minister Koirala to discourage the people from coming to Nepal to which Prime Minister Koirala expressed inability to do so because of public opinion and the opposition he would face from political parties. Although such a suggestion was theoretically correct, as no Bhutanese nationals could enter Nepal without valid travel documents, it was not possible for Nepal to prevent any person from coming after having crossed the Indian territory, as Indian and Nepali nationals are not required to possess such documents along the open Indo-Nepal border. It was also found that the Indian authorities themselves encouraged the southern Bhutanese to go to Nepal when they are required to transit themselves from Bhutan to Nepal.

Greater Nepal

The bogey of "greater Nepal" is being increasingly publicized by the Bhutanese government in order to drive a wedge between the Nepali and Indian governments. King Jigme Singye Wanchhuk himself said that the Nepali politicians, including those of the ruling Congress party, were "supporting the Nepali speakers in Bhutan in their campaign to form a separate Nepali state." The foreign minister Dawa Tsering was more explicit in his BBC interview on May 25, 1993, saying that certain elements dreaming of "greater Nepal" in the entire Himalayan region were active

behind the Bhutan problem. On this issue both Subash Ghising, the Gorkha National Liberation Front leader of Darjeeling, and Dawa Tsering of Bhutan are together despite their contradictory positions on the Bhutanese ethnic problem. The foreign minister of Bhutan, Dawa Tsering, said before a visiting Amnesty International delegation that the Nepali-speaking southern Bhutanese were "supported by groups and individuals in India and Nepal who support the concept of greater Nepal which is based on the premise that the Himalayas are the natural home of the Nepalese, a myth which is not supported by historical fact."¹⁸ Elaborating further as reported by the official paper, *Kuensel*, Dawa Tsering told the National Assembly:

It was not merely out of ethnic affinity that the political parties and people of Nepal were supporting the anti-nationals of southern Bhutan, but more out of their deep-seated desire to promote the concept of a Greater Nepal. This concept envisaged Nepalese domination over the entire Himalayas by bringing Bhutan, parts of the Duars in West Bengal and Assam and the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland under Nepalese control just as in the case of Sikkim and Darjeeling.¹⁹

Despite such fears and anxiety of Bhutan, the Nepali side had never given any inkling towards the "greater Nepal" idea. On the contrary, Prime Minister Koirala has had been repeatedly saying that the idea is "a product of unstable minds" and that Nepal is satisfied with the existing international boundary. Only a few Nepali poets and writers reminiscence Nepal's past glories, without any ambition for future adventures. Regarding the correlationship between the greater Nepal idea and the Lhotsampha movement in Bhutan, it is only a question of power-sharing and dispensation of justice for them. As Kanak Dixit, a journalist, said in his attempt to probe into the subject, no Bhutanese dissident leaders or parties seem to have been motivated by such idea of "greater Nepal."

Nepal-India-Bhutan Triangle

The Bhutanese strategy of frightening India by pointing to the threat of greater Nepal in which the entire Nepali speaking Himalayan region is included seems incredible in view of Nepal's own severe limitations on such issues. Indian leaders are unlikely to be so easily swept away by such a "grand design" highlighted by Ghising or Dawa Tsering. The former has been almost marginalized in recent years; the latter's case is understandable because of the unprecedented pressure of dissidents who have at least been

able to build a case against the royal regime. And democracy and human rights have now become additional agenda which have put the regime on the defensive.

The Indian position on the Nepal-Bhutan trade-off is characterized by both neutrality and caution, suggesting that the two neighbours should resolve the issue bilaterally without third party mediation. The Indian Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, was stated to have listened to the Nepali Prime Minister, G.P. Koirala's version of the failure of the bilateral talks during the recent SAARC summit. Yet, Indian quiet mediation seems to be in the offing. But it should be understood that India is hardly prepared to oblige Nepal by putting adequate pressure on Bhutan.

If the Bhutanese crisis lingers showing no sign of abatement, all the three countries are likely to be engulfed by the spillover effects of refugees. Certain negative trends are visible today in Jhapa District of Nepal as the refugees are increasingly becoming social problems. The refugees are unwanted on most accounts. "They seem to represent an economic burden, a political liability, a foreign policy complication, or all of the above."²⁰ For Nepal, it is already a burden; for India, the security implications will increase if the crisis remains unresolved; and for the *ancient regime* in Bhutan, it is not only an ethnic problem demanding appropriate solution but it will cost the royal regime heavily if it remains intransigently stubborn. The perceived threat of refugees may turn out to be real, making it a political ploy by some unforeseen forces and trends as had happened in the case of Sri Lankan Tamils.

Thus, both the receiving, sending and intermediary states involved in the refugee conditions are likely to be affected by the turn of events. The sending state (Bhutan) is likely to be hard hit by the continuation of refugee movements attracting the attention of wide ranging agencies and international forums. Moreover, the refugees may turn into rebels to realize their goals. Such a situation also tends to promote revanchist or irredentist sentiments if other methods fail to yield result.

If the traditional monarchical Kingdom of Bhutan is subject to ethnic and political crises, Nepal, as a receiving country, has started seeing negative trends in three broad areas: (1) Impact on civil society including environment, (2) democratic stability and (3) impact on foreign policy. Deforestation and the other elements of environmental degradation are connected with the influx of refugees and their routine activities. The second issue is both psychological and political in that it implies the credibility of the elected government. If the government fails to tackle the issue due to external and internal machinations, it may pose threats to democracy itself. For most anti-democratic forces unreconciled to the successful democracy

movement of 1990, the low performance record of the government on social, economic, and diplomatic areas would be negatively exploited by the retrogressive forces.

A government which was and still is a novice in both domestic and foreign policy is being grilled by the highly sensitive opposition and other so-called "nationalist" forces opposed to the Congress Party. As there are other crucial areas requiring immediate governmental attention that sidetrack the efforts of the government. More significant, the foreign policy of a small country is the most talked about subject within the country trying – knowingly or unknowingly to discredit the government on this count. When the issue of internationalization of the refugee problem became a subject of public debate, the position of the government was somewhat watered down to saying that Nepal's version of internationalization of the issue of refugees was nothing more than the drawing of attention of the international community to the financial burden incurred by Nepal. At the Congress Working Committee meeting, Prime Minister Koirala said that the government had not yet decided to internationalize the Bhutanese refugee problem. Emphasizing on the bilateral talk, he said that he had presented the issue at the diplomatic level only as one viewpoint.

Such a moderate position taken by Nepal could considerably ease the vexed problem through bilateral negotiations in July. Accordingly, a ministerial level meeting was held in Kathmandu in last October which agreed to screen the refugees for determining their status. Four categories of people staying in the refugee camps were made. They were: Bhutanese nationals forcibly driven out of the country, immigrants from Bhutan, non-Bhutanese nationals and Bhutanese nationals who are guilty of different crimes.

Although the implications for Bhutan transcend polity, society and economy because of the involvement of one of the principal communities of southern Bhutan, the issue seems to have been precipitated by the inability of the power elites to go beyond their set traditional agenda of governance. Always haunted by the shadow of the Nepali population, whatever developments took place in adjoining areas – Sikkim, Darjeeling and Nepal – have caused "consternation in Bhutan." It has been said that "Gorkha militancy in Darjeeling arose further Bhutani suspicions about Nepali settlers." Whatever its basis, the cultural anxiety of the Drukpas has expressed itself in an unfortunate programme of depopulation. But does cultural anxiety alone explain the Government's cruelty towards the Lhotsamphas? What else accounts for the obvious insensitivity of the *dzongdas* and *dungpas* (District Administrators and sub-divisional officers) as they chase the Lhotshampas from the souther hills?"²¹

For Bhutan, the conflict is not between two communities; threat perceptions of the rulers give rise to conflict. Such perceptions, which are common in South Asia, tend to close other options due to fear that any concessions given to demanding people to fear that any concessions given to demanding people would erode the traditional power structure. Sometimes, refugees also provide more options and benefits for the receiving countries, though for the short run, as happened to Pakistan during the Afghan conflict. All cases are not beneficial. During the Cold War, the extra regional option could be conveniently used for realizing certain objectives, as there was a tendency of a superpower and its allies to get involved for removing both immediate and long-term threats emanating from their adversaries. But the situation changed following the withdrawal of an interventionist power or the minimization, if not resolution, of conflict. Following the Soviet withdrawal and subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union along with the collapse of communism, the Afghan problem is almost forgotten by those who were involved in containing the Soviet threats in Afghanistan. Now Pakistan is being branded as a center of drug smugglers and terrorists by its former allies, impressing on us how a receiving country experiences social and political tensions. Presenting Pakistan as a case in point, the *International Herald Tribune* succinctly reported: "A nation that once was a linchpin of U.S. foreign policy has become casualty of post-Cold War political realignments. Amid domestic political turmoil, Pakistan is struggling to cope with the refuse of a superpower battle: a glut of weapons in the market place, large numbers of restless, combat-experienced foreign guerrillas, millions of Afghan refugees and an unbridled drug trade."²² We cannot expect a parallel situation of such after effects south of the Himalayas owing to a number of reasons, yet the prospect of the emergence of a new guerilla-type movement cannot be ruled out, especially where one hundred thousand refugees have failed to attract attention from the world community.

The influx of Bhutanese refugees into Nepal is not being seriously taken by the outside world because of the lesser importance of it to the big powers, either within the region or outside, despite the involvement of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNCHR). Even India is pursuing a policy of studied silence as the magnitude of the problem is not seriously felt by it. Thus, the Bhutanese authorities are apparently taking some calculated risks by forcing the undesirable people from their country, which in their thinking is going to permanently solve the problem. On the contrary, attributing the cause of the refugee exodus into Nepal, King Jigme Singye Wanchhuk said that "acts of violence by Nepali dissidents had forced people to leave the area", adding that some kinds of guerilla training were being

given to the people in camps within Nepal. Nepal has denied such allegations.

Apparently Bhutan seems to be in an advantageous situation due to the lack of any external pressure on it for creating favorable conditions for early repatriation of refugees. As India continues to pay short shrift to the problem in order not to hurt the sentiment of the Bhutanese power elites an early end is not in sight. Now Nepal should either depart from its present policy by developing its own capacity to permanently absorb the refugees or by sorting the problem out bilaterally on the basis of mutually agreed formula for determining the status of refugees. Such an approach seems to have been adopted by Nepal, thus modifying its hardened line of internationalizing the issue.

Although the two sides have lately agreed to hold ministerial meetings for determining the status of refugees, their mutual suspicion and distrust continues to haunt them. The Bhutanese side had allegedly changed its views on the status of refugees of "displaced" persons.

Relations between the two Himalayan Kingdoms have lacked cordiality throughout modern times. The principal reason is the fear and anxiety of the Bhutanese ruler that the increasing Nepali immigrants would in course of time influence the power structure of the *ancient regime*. The policy of *Driglam namzha* (cultural traditions), imposition of *Dzonkha*, and total allegiance to the king and his government incurred displeasure from the Bhutanese of Nepali origin. In addition, the government's controversial "Green belt" measure along the southern Indo-Bhutan border denying lands to the people for settlement was taken as a strategy to evict the people. Security considerations rather than environmental problems seemed to have prompted the authorities, as the other parts of Bhutan are green and "richly-forested". Hutt writes that "this policy involved the compulsory demolition of *Lhotshampa* homes, but was quietly discontinued, allegedly on the advice of alarmed foreign aid officials."²³

In conclusion, it can be said that the strained Nepal-Bhutan relations are unlikely to be smooth, even after the repatriation of refugees. The question remains how the Bhutanese monarch whose legitimacy issue would most probably recur as hundreds of expatriates have already vowed to democratize the obscurantist royal regime. Moreover, Bhutan is already exposed to the new democratic upsurge across the world, making the rulers jittery for preserving the status quo. Lashing out at the new demands for democratization of Bhutanese polity as an act of "anti-nationals", bitterness between the monarchy and the dissidents is unlikely to abate unless a compromise formula is worked out between them.

If a peaceful transition becomes difficult to manage at the present juncture, more sporadic violent activities are likely to be mounted by the opponents of the regime. The royal government may contrive divisions within the contending parties and diffuse the crisis, but it will not be a long-term solution unless some sort of reforms are introduced within the traditional monarchy. The Bhutanese power elites would be tempted to show a nexus between the Bhutanese dissidents operating either from India or Nepal or Nepal and the Nepali government. Although Nepal has no contiguous border with Bhutan, demographic continuity linking the Nepali dominated areas of Darjeeling, Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan would, in Bhutanese perception, encourage the irredentist trend in the entire Himalayan region.

Bhutanese authorities believe that the worst scenario would be the division of Bhutan into Nepali and non-Nepali states. Such an interpretation seems to have been overstretched without weighing Indian security environment in the Northeast. From Nepal's point of view, any effort to divide Bhutan on ethnic grounds would not be endorsed by either Nepal or India; security implications might arise for both the neighbours. Yet, Bhutan cannot remain indifferent to the demands and aspirations of its own people as any delay for the resolution of the present crisis will only add more woes and complications to the triangular relations.

Notes

1. Literatures regarding the relations between the Kingdom of Gorkha and the Kingdom of Bhutan are mentioned by some Nepali and foreign scholars. Some of the articles have appeared in *Contributions to Nepalese Studies*, Kathmandu. For more details, see Ramesh Dhungel, "Nepal-Bhutan Aitihashik Sanskritik Sambandha" (Nepal-Bhutan: Historical cultural Relations), *Contributions to Nepalese Studies*, 16:2; July 1989; Dilli Raj Sharma, "Nepal-Bhutan Sanskritik Sambandha Badhaunama Swayambhu Chaitya Tatha Gumbako Bhumika" (The role of Swayambhu Chitya and Gumba for strengthening Religious and Cultural Relations Between Nepal and Bhutan), *Ibid*, 17:2 (1990); and Shushila Manandhar, "Nepal-Bhutan Arthik Sambhandha: Aitihashik Swarup" (Nepal-Bhutan Economic Relations: Historical Nature), *Ibid*.
2. See *Himal Chuli Weekly* (Biratnagar), January 18 and February 8, 1987.
3. Ram Rahul, *Royal Bhutan* (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1983), p. 54.
4. *Ibid*.
5. Astri Suhrke, "Migration, State and Civil Society in Southeast Asia" (A Working Paper, CHR. Michelsen Institute, Norway, 1992).

6. See Myron Weiner, "On International Migration and International Relations," *Population and Development Review*, 11.3: September 1985, pp. 44-46.
7. *Memorandum To honourable Member of Indian Parliament on the Political Crisis in Bhutan by the President Bhutan National Democratic Party, July 1992.*
8. Amnesty International, *Bhutan: Human Rights Violations against the Nepali Speaking Population in the South, December 1992.*
9. Kanak Mani Dixit, "The Dragon Bites its Tail," *Himal* (Kathmandu), July-August 1992, p. 7
10. Michael Hutt, "Refugees from Shanri-la" (A Paper presented at the Seminar at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London on March 21-33, 1993).
11. Thierry Mathou, "The Growth of Diplomacy in Bhutan, 1961-191: Opportunities and Challenges" (A Paper Contributed to the Conference on *Bhutan: A traditional Order and the Forces of Changes*, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 22-23 March, 1993.
12. Ibid.
13. Hutt, n. 10.
14. *Kuensel*, April 17, 1993.
15. *Rising Nepal*, April 13, 1993.
16. Ibid.
17. Prime Minister G.P. Koirala's recent interview with some leading Nepali journalists indicated that both Thimpu and Kathmandu are now preparing for continuing their negotiations at the ministerial level. See also *Rising Nepal*, June 7, 1993.
18. Cited in Kanak Dixit, n. 9.
19. Ibid.
20. Suhrke, n. 5.
21. Roy Choudhary as cited in Dixit, n. 9.
22. *International Herald Tribune* (The Hague), April 23, 1993.
23. Hutt, n. 10.

THINKING THROUGH NEPAL'S BHUTAN PROBLEM*

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Already faced with a trouble caused by the ecological refugees, Nepal is bleeding under the increasing pressure of political refugees from Bhutan. Preoccupied with its exclusivist nationalist urge, Bhutan is forcibly evicting a large number of apparently permanent refugees on a scale that the receiving country Nepal has never experienced before. No end to the flow is in sight or any political solution visible.

Refugees are not an unprecedented or new phenomenon in Nepal. A sizable number of Tibetan refugees is still a reality. Nepal has absorbed refugees of Nepali origin from Burma. A repatriation of refugees from one third country (Bangladesh) to other third country (Pakistan) was successfully achieved by Nepal. On the account of the Bhutanese refugees Nepal is neither prepared to absorb them nor able to repatriate them successfully to their home country.

The reason for this in large part lies in the characteristics of the refugees, and it has significantly influenced the relationship between the host and the home countries. For Nepal, ethnic affinity is a conspicuous reason for receiving the refugees, whereas for Bhutan the threat of ethnicity has determined its policy to evict the domiciles. Second, the people who have been forcibly evicted from Bhutan are generally considered anti-regime. Third, these people are also assumed to be illegal migrants to Bhutan and, therefore, are not the responsibility of the Thimpu government. The conclusion is that Bhutan is reluctant to recognize the refugees in Nepal as being its citizens.

This view was predominant in the thinking of the Bhutanese king who had spoken in an interview to the Indian press about the Bhutanese "struggle for

* Prepared for the Round Table Discussion Organized by the Political Science Association of Nepal at Hotel Annapurna April 5, 1993.

survival" while pointing an accusing finger towards Nepal for giving shelters to "anti-nationals" from Bhutan. At the same breadth, he refused to recognize most of the people having refugee status in Nepal to be from Bhutan. Rather, they are the people who had returned from north-east India, he said.

The above narrative suggests that king Jigme was astute in making his points. The king appears to be unamenable to the offers made by Nepal to settle a problem which could creep into their bilateral relations. The king had clearly steered his country away from being a party in the issue of negotiating the refugee problem because he seems to be less inclined to recognize the trouble he himself has created.

While appraising the refugee situation in Nepal, these remarks were both unfortunate and uncalled for in view of the talks that the Bhutanese foreign minister had with the Nepalese officials and Prime Minister in Kathmandu in November 1992. Nepal has taken exception to the King's remarks implying that Nepal had become a sanctuary for the Bhutanese "anti-nationals", which, if stretched, could be subject to interpretation for encouraging terrorism in Bhutan.

This has further complicated the attempts of the policymakers in Nepal to evolve amenable strategies for negotiating a resolution to the refugee problem. Negotiations could start from the point of a mutual sharing of the problem, something which appears to be virtually absent from the Bhutanese mindset. It could be said that Bhutan is driven by the urge to (a) force Nepal to accept that the majority of the refugees are indeed illegal immigrants to Bhutan from Nepal and (b) force Nepal to negotiate on these Bhutanese terms in exchange for stopping the flow. Nepal is not in a position to accept either refugees as fait accompli or negotiate on the Bhutanese terms before Bhutan accepts that all the refugees are indeed from Bhutan.

Nepal's "quiet diplomacy" in this respect has still to bear fruit. If King Jigme's words were to be taken as any guide, Nepal has to rethink its muted responses to the issue. Assumptions that have led to the adoption of "quiet diplomacy" as a strategy to deal with the problem have already been proven as unfounded. Bhutan is unavailable for talk. An earlier illusion that Nepal could use its good ties with India to restrain the Bhutanese behaviour was unrealistic. A misreading of India's national interests has made Nepal postponed taking up its own national interests with Bhutan. Meanwhile Bhutan has successfully exercised its choice in favour of its regime interests which are apparently tied up with the Indian geostrategic and socioeconomic interests in sustaining Bhutan's prime facie requirements of political stability. Nepal should understand that unless India decides to dissuade Bhutan from its present course, the humanitarian measures and the world opinion could do precious little to change Thimpu's policy. Aid from the

international agencies and humanitarian efforts are going to be solely confined to easing the pressure of the refugees on the host nation and containing them to where they are, in order to prevent their flow to other prosperous areas or even say to the industrialized world. Already preoccupied with even bigger refugee problems elsewhere, the Western world would be less forthcoming to this problem emerging on the fringe of South Asia. Hence Nepal has to deal with its problem within the region by assessing the likely implications of refugees on its socioeconomic and political health.

- Irrespective of their ancestral link with Nepal, the refugees are a threat when the country is increasingly becoming unable to withstand their pressure. For a country which is already overpopulated, and which has a high incidence of unemployment and extremely limited resources, the increasing number of refugees could become socially and economically destabilizing. In Nepal's case the volume of refugees really matters. A plausible risk of permitting the influx of refugees to last too long could make the refugee problem expand to the political dimension of the relationship not only between the home and the host country but also between and among different refugee groups and the host country as well. Bhutan is on the record to have accused Nepal of providing military training to its rebels. It has also held Nepal responsible for a number of activities that the Bhutanese of Nepali ethnicity commit inside Bhutan. Likewise the existence of politically contentious groups among the refugees could probably lead them to take advantage of the democratic setting of the host country and exploit the situation to support their cause. If they fail to do so, there is a probability of turning themselves against the host country. If the refugees become a divisive force, they can muster support from the internal dynamics of the domestic politics in the host country or even involve themselves in certain untoward activities which could be damaging to the interests of the host country. Numerous examples drawn from the international refugee situations support this contention. Refugees are being used for terrorism, sabotage, arms smuggling, drug traffickings and so on. Even opposition parties to the host government could provide a fertile ground for refugees to indulge in such activities to discredit the ruling party.
- The risk to the host government can be independent of the social, ethnic and economic characteristics of the refugees. Such a threat becomes acute when the home country adopts an unwanted population dumping policy and the host government finds itself in a dilemma of having to cope with the challenge.

As the time lapses, these perceived risks could become the reality in the country. Unfortunately, it seems that Nepal is drawing closer to this reality than any hope of settling the problem. Bhutan's attitude towards Nepal has clearly indicated that there is not going to be any type of settlement if refugees are to be repatriated to Bhutan. But for Nepal, Bhutan is still relevant to its refugee problem, and negotiations with the king are imperative. To settle the problem, Bhutan needs to change its attitude. The question is whether this could be brought about through persuasion or appeasement. Nepal has to balance its role between diplomatic efficacy and merely giving in to the terms that Bhutan poses. This leads to the questions of how Nepal should respond to the seemingly unsettled refugee problem.

How Should Nepal Respond?

Nepal's interests could not be more than a systematic repatriation of refugees to their home country. The problem is how should Nepal pursue this policy. Initially, a national consensus emerged on three strategies. A direct leadership contact, seek help from India or failing this, internationalize the issue. Bhutan's refusal to recognize the problem, India's refusal to be a party to the problem, and Nepal's second thought on drawing global attention to the problem has contained the issue within scanty debating circles in Nepal.

The emerging debates in Nepal are also inconclusive and uninfluential in national policy making. At the one extreme of the debate there are democratic enthusiasts and human right activists who argue in favour of endorsing the democratic aspirations of the Bhutanese people and advocate that the Nepalese value premises should not be compromised on any term. The Bhutanese king must compromise with reality and must honour the democratic urge of his people. Reverence for absolute monarchical rule has lost currency in Nepal, and this is also reflected in the general Nepalese attitude towards the monarchy in Bhutan. This has complicated the issue further as Bhutan fears that any opening up or liberalization could tax the monarchy. It dubbed the exiled people in Nepal as anti-monarchists and anti-nationals.

Others — in Nepal suggest less emotively that the refugee issue has its origin in the ethnic problem created by the cultural cleansing policy in Bhutan. The problem arises out of Bhutan's preference for preserving its Buddhist tradition, maintaining ethno-cultural homogeneity, retaining the dominance of the ruling ethnic community over another. The Nepali domiciles as being different and distinct religious stock in their sociocultural formation and their sizable population, which is comparable or even more than the ruling Drupka community, has been perceived as a threat that made Bhutan to undertake fundamental decisions to revise Citizenship act, distort census, articulate Drupka identity, transmitting it to the singular notion of

"land, race and faith" by advocating exclusivist nationalism. A reflection of this could be found in the Bhutanese King's assertion that his people are "struggling for their survival." This perception is surely to lead towards an intensification of the problem as Bhutan will continue to evict the Nepali ethnic people, and Nepal, as a receiving and host country, will find it increasingly difficult to deal with the refugee problem. The conclusion is that both will lose due to their strained relations.

The third argument is that Nepal has initially failed to take the refugee problem seriously because its attention is elsewhere. The refugee problem has made little impact on its foreign policy pursuit. Occasional rhetorics were made with little relevance to its policy except to draw charitable external fundings. The government did not care.

All these views, however, run counter to the widespread feelings in certain circles whose perspective on the issue is shaped by the constraints of state-centric international relationships more than anything else. What can a country like Nepal do in such a situation? This is a more critical problem from a nation-state perspective than the actual plight of the refugee, as that reality could not be belied. There are instances of critical damage to the relationships between the sending and the receiving countries. The embattled Indo-Sri Lankan situation over the Tamils and the Indo-Pak War of 1971 under the pretext of the refugee exodus from the then East Pakistan are two crucial examples fresh in the memory of the South Asian leadership. Nepal is not in a situation of moving to that extreme to repatriate the refugees. It can argue to stop the exodus, but this needs a policy which was sorely lacking previously. The postponement of developing policy initially had its own disadvantage. And as the trickle of refugees has now become a torrent, the situation is becoming internally explosive and externally conflictual with the sending country. It is time for Nepal to seriously take up the issue with Bhutan, because conflicts are not avoided by refusing to discuss their implications.

Cashing in on the troubles of a neighbour should not be a prime dictum of any policy. Nepal has never indulged in such a practice. If the policy were to follow such premises, it should be recognized that the refugee problem facing Nepal is not confined to the country alone. The problem should be shared mutually by both the sending and receiving countries. What happens in Nepal and Bhutan is not without repercussion at the regional level too. Hence, apart from the mutual responsibility of both receiving and sending countries, there is a third dimension to the problem which should be reassessed and considered. This way the problem could be addressed systematically. The following loosely structured propositions should be

taken into consideration while formulating Nepal's Bhutan policy in the context of the refugee problem.

- Nepal needs to make a basic and adequate policy decision for the negotiation vital to its national interests. It is essential to precisely read and obtain a correct assessment of circumstances in which the leadership in Nepal and Bhutan are placed. The question is whether Bhutan intends to receive back the refugees and if so whether that return will be conditional.
- If so, Nepal could push for the existing proposal, to begin with, for the commissioning of the joint investigating team to verify the authenticity of the refugee nationality—bilaterally or with the assistance of a third party.
- Nepal should also try to persuade the Bhutanese leadership to understand the reality that democracy and revolution are not exportable. This requires building rapport between the leadership to which Nepal has been particularly interested. Further contacts are still considered, and reassurance from the Nepali side on this point would be the best bet to read Bhutanese response.
- If Bhutan insists on the previous point that the people having refugee status in Nepal are not indeed Bhutanese or even refuses to recognize all of them to be Bhutanese, Nepal obtains two choices to pursue from the above context:
 - i. As the problem tends to imply multiplicity about the origin of refugees, the problem transforms itself to be of multilateral dimension. It provides Nepal a chance to persuade both India and Bhutan to consider the problem by evolving negotiation strategies.
 - ii. If both Bhutan and India were not available to discuss the issue bilaterally or in the multilateral context, the situation then does not prevent Nepal from raising this peculiar issue of population implosion in the country and request for the cooperation and assistance from all the friendly SAARC countries in finding out the way out to help resolve the problem through SAARC undertaking. This way, Nepal could avoid the so-called internationalization of the problem at once by drawing immediate attention of the SAARC nations to address the situation.

- As a last resort, under the pretext of monitoring refugee behaviour and their systematic rehabilitation inside Nepal, the government must prevent further influx of refugees at their entry points. Certain social tension could arise out of this act but it might discourage the influx from the third country in future.
- Nepal should take initiatives in negotiating separately with Bhutan to persuade it to agree on the point that no further eviction of the people of Nepali ethnic stock under the pretext of their self-decision to leave the country would eventuate.
- Nepal should also persuade Bhutan to make 1958 as a cut off point to determine Bhutanese citizenship or illegal migration.
- Nepal should take the case with India separately, initially negotiating on the point of discouraging the transportation of the Nepali ethnic people from across the Bhutanese border for off-loading at the Nepal-India border. This should be done in the context of addressing the Bhutanese attention to the refugee problem in Nepal and make it recognize that the refugees in Nepal are actually from Bhutan, not elsewhere. Otherwise, as Bhutan maintains, it will have no business to be a party to negotiation.

The question Nepal must address at this juncture, therefore, is how to proceed from this dead-end to achieve its ultimate objective. To my mind, Nepal must recognize the need of an unconventional approach to the refugee problem. Nepal must take an initiative to develop a regional approach to its refugee problem by linking it with the environmental protection venture for which the SAARC countries had previously decided to pull their resources together to help each other by declaring the year 1992 as the "SAARC Year of Environment." It is advisable to Nepal to try to incorporate the refugee issue as an agenda for the "Regional Studies on the causes and consequences of Natural Disasters and the Protection and Preservation of Environment", a study the SAARC has jointly undertaken. This way, Nepal could raise the refugee issue at the SAARC summit, and if courage be there, Nepal could also request for the immediate action for the establishment of a 'green army' to prevent further refugee flow from Bhutan which could become a cause of national disaster in Nepal.

It may not be easy. It may even prove to be futile. But no task is easily done. This attempt, therefore, should not be left untried. Although it would be better never to say what option Nepal may be considering, it should, however, try to take the initiative by making Bhutan think seriously about the step that Nepal might take next.

RESEARCH NOTE

ROLE OF THE EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY POLITICAL PARTY IN MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF THE CPN-UNITY CENTRE

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Introduction

Some ultra-radical factions of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), who are against the multiparty Constitution of Nepal 2047(1991)¹ decided to abstain from the general elections in 1991 and agreed to be unite among themselves. Accordingly, they established the CPN-Unity Centre with three runaway factions of: (1) CPN-Mashal (Prachanda); (2) CPN-Fourth Convention (Nirmal Lama); and, (3) CPN-Peasant's Organization (headed by Rupal Biswakarma, who had split from CPN "Rohit" faction) on November 23, 1990. A thirteen member central committee was formed with 6 members from Fourth Convention, 4 members from Mashal, and 3 members from Peasant's Organization. Narabahadur Karmacharya became spokesman of the militant left group. Later, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai joined in the party. Similarly, CPN-People Oriented (Bidari) faction had also joined into the group. The main objective of this communist group is to establish a republican state.

Since the formation of the Unity Centre, the discussion on the issue of elections were held within the party until the formation of United People's Front, Nepal (UPFN). However, there was some confusion in the beginning because it could not decide whether or not to participate in elections. But, later by evaluating the pre-election national scene, the Unity Centre decided "to use elections to expose the multiparty system", but not for the positive participation. In this regard, Nara Bahadur Karmacharya, central spokesman of the Unity Centre declared that the party will not participate in elections in its own name and decided to support the candidates of UPFN.²

Unity Centre and UPFN

The UPFN was formed on January 21, 1991 under the convenorship of Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. The main initiative was taken by the Unity Centre and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist faction (MLM).³ In this regard, some members of the new grouping later held that the UPFN as such was not a real party, but a front for the Unity Centre established to fulfill the formal procedure for the registration of a political party to participate in the elections. They expressed that their main party is Unity Centre which is not registered as it has not reconciled to the constitution and it maintains revolution as its basic purpose, whereas UPFN is political front of the Unity Centre. Thus, the UPFN depends on programmes and policies of the Unity Centre. Therefore, they feel that UPFN may dissolve but Unity Centre will not. Thus, UPFN is the "showing teeth" of the Unity Centre. This was proven by Unity Centre by removing MLM from the reorganization of UPFN, because MLM was not involved with the Unity Centre. And, they feel that Unity Centre is still in underground stage and UPFN is in semi-underground stage.

Objectives of the Unity Centre

The main objective of the party is to establish republican state through people's revolution. Its first national convention in 1991 approved a revolutionary programme for the party, called for a revolutionary joint front and agreed to establish a *people's army* under its leadership in order to its objectives.⁴ The national convention also declared that its guiding principle was to be based on Marxism-Leninism-Maosim, and which involved the adoption of a policy of encircling urban areas from villages and organizing a movement against the present reactionary regime, which they contend is based on an alliance between the King and the Nepali Congress.⁵

Splitting Nature of the Leadership of the Unity Centre

After the third national convention called by Pushpalal in May 1968 in Gorakhpur, India, split and conflict among the various leaders within the CPN had taken a crucial turn.

In December 1971, after release from jail, Man Mohan Adhikari, Sambhuram Shrestha, Mohan Bikram Singh, Nirmal Lama and Ganga Lal Shrestha had emphasized to unite all the splinter groups of CPN and for the purpose they had formed "Central nucleus" committee.⁶ Among them, Man Mohan Adhikari, Sambhuram Shrestha and Mohan Bikram Singh were given to handle the office of central nucleus committee. And, Sambhuram Shrestha and Man Mohan Adhikari were sent to unity-talks among the communists with Pushpalal. Pushpa Lal welcomed the dialogue, but, it became unsuccessful, because Sambhuram Shrestha had made proposal to dissolve

the party before unification. On the other hand, because of internal conflict between the issue of Mao China, and the Constitution Assembly, the central nucleus committee became defunct. Later, this was paralyzed by Mohan Bikram Singh by holding the fourth national convention in 1974 in India, as a runaway faction of the CPN.⁷ This faction duly emerged as the most powerful ground at that time.

In May 1980, Rishi Devkota had resigned from the central committee of Fourth Convention charging that the leadership had guided the party in "revisionism" and did not protest Soviet social imperialism and tried to make workers its blind supporters. After the resignation of Rishi Devkota, internal conflicts in the party heightened. Groupism in the party developed basically in three groups and each group charged each other which made honesty and morality worst within the party. In this regard, party had taken disciplinary action against Mohan Bikram Singh. Then Nirmal Lama became general secretary of the party. After two years, Nirmal Lama had to resign after the inclusion of Mohan Bikram Singh in the central committee. Then Bhakta Bahadur Shrestha (Shersingh) became general secretary. Party had taken disciplinary action against once again Mohan Bikram Singh. Consequently Nirmal Lama was expelled from the party.⁸

In the meantime, general secretary, Bhakta Bahadur Shrestha was arrested in 1983. Two members of the central committee had also resigned from the central committee. This created legitimacy problem in the party. Consequently, in November 1983, news of split of the Fourth Convention was flashed suggesting that Jayagovinda Shah, Nirmal Lama, Suryanath Yadav, Dil Bahadur Shrestha, Narabahadur Karmacharya, Niranjana Chapagain, Shyam Shrestha and Kailasa (Debendra Lal Shrestha) were in one side, and Mohan Bikram Singh, Chitra Bahadur K.C., Mohan Vaidya, Khampa Singh, Bachaspati Devkota, Chandra Prasad Gajurel, Bhairab Regmi and R. Shrestha were in other side.⁹ This led to another split.

As a consequence, in 1983, Mohan Bikram Singh formed CPN-Masal. In November 1984, he was suspended for six months by the convention of 1984 in Gorakhpur charging all the leftists were in rightist way. When he was included in the central committee of the party after six months again conflict was started. Then, he wrote an article charging the "role of C.I.D. and agent of enemy in the party", "majority had suppressed to the minority in the party" and "need of rebellion from the party". Similarly, Masal had also criticized the activities of Mohan Bikram Singh. Then again in November 1985 he was expelled from the party "charging involvement in anti-party activities." In the same month he formed central committee of 5 members. Through this new group, he called the first national convention in March

1986.¹⁰ On the strength of this convention once again he became general secretary.

Again in 1991, a group of leaders and workers from Masal - Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, Sittal Kumar, Sindhunath Pyakurel, and others rebelled against the Masal party under the control of Mohan Bikram Singh. The central spokesman of Masal, Sindhunath Pyakurel declared that the meeting of March 15-16 had appointed Sittal Kumar as general secretary and himself as central spokesman,¹¹ thus supposedly easing out Mohan Bikram Singh from the party framework.

Similarly, Ruplal Biswakarma had also split from the Nepal Workers and Peasant's Party of "Rohit". And, Ram Narayan Bidari had also split from the People Oriented Party of NCP-Rupchandra Bista. Hence the mushrooming growth of the roller-coaster communist parties in Nepal rose.

Even after the formation of UPFN, Rohit had withdrawn his position from the UPFN after the failure of talk with CPN-Unity Centre in regards to general elections. Meanwhile, after the restructure of UPFN in August 17, 1991, the MLM had also withdrawn its position from UPFN charging the Front became a rubber stamp of the Unity Centre.

Nirmal Lama had participated in United Left Front in 1990, also represented in the Constitution Drafting Commission from the ULF in 1990. During the period of drafting constitution, he had tried to gain popularity by leaking some of the critical issue in the constitutional debates. This behaviour earned him endearment but also made him an ineffective member of the constitutional drafting committee.

A further split and conflict between two leaders, Prachanda (Pushpa Kamal Dahal) and Nirmal Lama, was observed in first national convention on November 25, 1991, held in Chitwan district of the country. Both leaders of the Unity Centre blamed each other as becoming "revisionist it and centrist",¹² but none was responsible to the split, because the split has its own momentum. This momentum was created by their personal greed and ambition to remain the top.

Therefore, the conflicting behaviour as well as splitting nature of leadership made a question mark on the continuity and stability of the Unity Centre to achieve its objectives.

Role of Unity Centre on Different Issues

Unity Centre had supported the civil servants' agitation which was started only three months after the elected government took office on July 1, 1991 and blamed the government for discrimination. To support the civil servants' agitation the leaders of Unity Centre in the legislature who are the MPs from UPFN, boycotted the Parliament on August 9, 1991 with other opposition

Mps. They marched in a black flag procession to the Bhadrakali temple, where some employees were on fasting.¹³ On August 24, 1991, agitation was suspended and hunger strike was called-off without solving the problems.

Similarly, MPs from UPFN in Parliament had boycotted the Parliament meetings with other opposition MPs, staged demonstrations at the gate of *Singha Durbar* (Secretariat), and organized joint procession with UML, Unity Centre and independent communist leaders from Basantapur to open air theatre at Tundikhel to protest against the understanding reached with India on water resources. The mass meeting was called by leader of UML - C.P. Mainali, leader of Unity Centre - Nirmal Lama, Convenor of UPFN - Dr. Baburam Bhattarai and leader of UPFN - Lilamani Pokharel.

On April 3, 1993 MPs of UPFN voiced against the bill, when the bill was proposed in the Lower House to ammend the treaty law which was originated from the Upper House.

Call for a Joint Movement by Unity Centre

Nirmala Lama, one of the leader of the Unity Centre formed Central Action Committee on his own convenorship to launch a joint movement to protest against the government. He also declared that the committee was holding negotiations with other parties to achieve the objectives. This committee had forwarded 8 demands such as to control the price increase in essential goods, problems of employees and squatters, Congressization, etc. Later, this committee was renamed into Joint People's Action Committee. On March 5, a delegation of the Joint People's Action Committee, led by Nirmal Lama handed over a memorandum containing 14 demands (see, Annexure - I) to the Prime Minister, Girija Prasad Koirala.¹⁴ The Joint People's Action Committee set the different programmes for March 27, 1992.

In this regard, it had carried out nationwide demonstrations on March 20, 1992 in support of 14 demands. In Kathmandu, a public meeting was held at Basantapur, and in the public meeting, MP of the United People's Front Lilamani Pokharel spoke against the monarchy and Nepali Congress, Dinnath Sharma (Masal) charged Nepali Congress as an agent of "Indian expansionism", while Krishna Bhakta Shrestha (Communist League) called resignation of Prime Minister, "because he signed traitorous treaties with India and paid no attention to the problems of the people".¹⁵ Later, some groups from the Joint People's Action Committee, MLM, Masal, and Communist League had disagreed when the proposal of "Nepal Bandh" on April 6, 1992 was made by Unity Centre to observe as historic day as "people's movement day" the day when people's movement won a victory in 1990, with nationwide strikes and demonstrations, and public meeting at

open air theatre at Tundikhel to protest against the dearness of essential commodities, insecurity, Congressization, handover of water resources to India etc.¹⁶ Then, the bandh programme was declared by the Unity Centre and UPFN in the name of Central Action Committee. Two days after the declaration of the movement, the conflicts and disturbances occurred in different places of the kingdom such as incidences of clashes between the students of Nepal Vidyarthi Sangh and Akhil Nepal Vidyarthi Sangh in Ratna Rajya Laxmi Campus on March 30, 1992 and on March 31, 1992 in Law Campus. Similarly, in relation to "Nepal Bandh" on April 6, 1992, blackout was observed throughout the city on April 5 and destroyed some public property by the demonstrators during the blackout. On April 6, "Nepal Bandh" was observed completely throughout the country. Consequently, demonstrators encountered with police in different places and turned violent. The violence damaged a lot of public property in one side and in the other so many people were killed [The killed persons were 16 according to UPFN, 15 according to *Suruchi* weekly paper (April 12-18, 1992) and 14 according to the *Report of Human Rights Organization*] and injured.¹⁷ To control the situation curfew was imposed in Kathmandu and Lalitpur municipalities till April 10, 1992. Then, convenor of Central Action Committee, Nirmal Lama had dissolved the Joint People's Action Committee to form new Action Committee by inviting all the left forces.

Later, the understandings were reached between Nepali Congress and UML, and signed on 6 points agreement¹⁸ (See Annexure - II). One Interesting point is that the movement was called by Unity Centre. At the first stage of the movement UML had shown only moral support. Later, it was directly involved in the movement. But, at the end of the movement, UML went one step ahead and signed an agreement with the ruling party which not only concluded the movement but also disappointed to other leftist parties.

Concluding Observations

In the history of Nepalese politics, split of communist party started since 1968. Then factions of Nepal Communist Parties were fragmented in different units. In spite of their effort on unification of the party, this objective remains elusive due to various group interest, rival personal interest, personality clashes among its ambitious leadership. Though they could not reach any understanding on certain principles, they had however, forged a "functional Unity" when, for instance in 1990, the seven left forces had formed United Left Front in order to support the people's movement spearheaded by Nepali Congress. On the other hand, those radical left forces who were against the ULF had also formed United National People's Movement to support the movement separately.

In regards to the "functional Unity", all the left forces had supported each other directly or indirectly. For instance, when CPN-UML had supported civil servants' agitation, most of the left parties in Parliament had also supported the cause. Similarly, when *Nepal Bandh* on April 6, 1991 was called by Unity Centre, most of the left parties had supported and observed the cause. In Parliament, most of the MPs from left forces have uniformly maintained their unity on national issues, be it, on water resources, treaty laws, etc. But, without a "unity on principle" their "functional unity" could not prove much effective in all cases.

The "functional unity" of the Unity Centre lacks main principles, strategy and future perspective. And, the ever splitting nature as well as most ambitious character of leadership are the barriers against "unity on principles". Therefore, without "unity on principles", the significance of "functional unity" has been largely symbolic since the image of the Unity Centre has been reduced to one of a destabilizing force in the country. Will it eventually be able to forge the much needed "unity on principles?" This point depends mostly on the idiosyncrosies of the group itself.

Next, the Unity Centre had adopted two distinct lines - one is revolution against the constitutional monarchy, and other is to use Parliament to expose the parliamentary system through UPFN. Are both of these objectives of the party under constitutional framework and multiparty political system?

Lastly, with factionalism constantly followed by personality classes among its leaders, the main question is whether the Unity Centre continue to survive in the future.

Annexture - I
Fourteen Point Demands Made by the Unity Centre

1. Control prices of fertilizer, electricity, water, telephone and daily necessary goods. Stop black-marketing, smuggling and corruption.
2. Stop Congressization on administration, education, communication and in other fields.
3. Stop government terror, killing, firing, suppression and hooliganism.
4. Abrogate of unequal treaty, agreement and understanding including 1950 Treaty. And, cancel the understanding covering the handover of rivers to India.
5. Provide settlement for the squatters and stop their displacement without providing alternate areas of settlement.
6. Stop the expell and suspension of employees. Reappoint the employees who were expelled during the last strike.
7. Fix the wages of industrial and agricultural labourers. Make arrangements to provide the work and food for the unemployees.
8. Stop injustice and exploitation of farmers. Fix reasonable market price for agricultural products.
9. Stop commercialization of the education sector and make education fee and materials available at a reasonable price.
10. Stop differentiation of the depressed people and the untouchable. Provide equal opportunity in communication media, including Radio and T.V. for all languages.
11. Stop all kinds of partiality towards women including selling them on the market. End partiality on distribution of citizenship certificate. Determine the right of property of daughter as equal to those of the sons.
12. Stop differentiation of people living in terai and remote areas. End partiality on distribution of citizenship certificate.
13. Take action against the corrupt people of Panchayat period.
14. Stop conspiracy between the King and the reactionary forces with the help of Congress government in reviving the game made by the people in the *Jana Andolan*.

Annexure - II
Six Points Agreement between the NC and the CPN-UML
to settle the April 6 incidence

Following are the agreed six points:

1. Both sides will make honest efforts to ensure that the local election are held in a peaceful manner;
2. They will form Peace and Understanding Committee at Central levels for resolving problems and disputes in an amicable manner, and also ensure full compliance with the code of conduct adopted recently by all parties in the presence of the Election Commission;
3. HMG will form a commission to inquire into the April 6-7 incidents in Kathmandu and elsewhere;
4. Adequate compensation will be paid to the victims of the April 6 firings, and arrangements will be made for the treatment of the injured;
5. both sides will take steps to ensure that such violence and terror, which harm the nation and democracy are not repeated, and
6. A consumer's Commission will be formed to study to what extent electricity charges and prices of essential commodities can be controlled or reduced.

Source: Sridhar K. Khatri, *Political Parties and Parliamentary Process in Nepal: A Study of the Transitional Phase* (POLSAN: Kathmandu, 1993), p. 27. See also, *Gorkhapatra*, May 1, 1992.

Notes

1. The four cardinal principles of the 1991 Constitution includes the concept of: constitutional monarchy, sovereignty of people, multiparty system and basic human rights.
2. *Press Digest*, January 21, 1991 and April 22, 1991, p. 153. Also in *Pristhabhumi*, January 17, 1991.
3. Recent Political Situation and Party Responsibilities, Proposal passed by the Central Ad hoc Committee by the meeting of September 21-23, 1991, Communist Party of Nepal-MLM, November 2, 1991, P. 16. Also in *Press Digest*, February 3, 1992. *Naya Nepal Post*, March 8, 1992.
4. *Press Digest*, December 23, 1991, p. 472. See, Political Resolutions, passed by National Convention of Unity Centre in December 1991.
5. Ibid.
6. Members of the Central Nuclus Committee were Man Mohan Adhikari, Sambhuran Shrestha, Mohan Bikram Singh, Nirmal Lama, Bharat

Mohan Adhikari, Ram Bahadur Hyamo, Jayagovinda Shah, Kamal Koirala, Siddi Lal Singh etc.

7. Bhim Rawl, *Communist Movement in Nepali Origin and Development*, Pairabi Publisher (Kathmandu: 1991), pp. 73-75.
8. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 79
11. *Press Digest*, March 25, 1991, p. 177. also in *Gorkhapatra*, March 21, 1991.
12. *Nepal Patra*, December 6, 1991. Also in *Bishwabhum*, December 8, 1991.
13. Ibid., p. 310.
14. *Press Digest*, March 9, 1992, pp. 89-90.
15. Ibid., March 30, 1992, p. 117.
16. *Dristi*, April 1, 1992.
17. Report, Civit Fact Finding Commission on April 6, 1992 Violence, pp. 25-26.
18. Sridhar K. Khatri, *Political Parties and Parliamentary Process in Nepal: A Study of the Transitional Phase* (POLSAN: Kathmandu, 1993), p. 27. See also, *Gorkhapatra*, May 1, 1992.

REVIEW ARTICLE

A CRITIQUE OF LEVI'S THEORY OF THE URBAN MESOCOSM

Stephen L. Mikesell

"I quite agree with you," said the Duchess; "and the moral of that is—'Be what you would seem to be'—or, if you'd like it put more simply—'Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise.'"

Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*

Robert I. Levy's *Mesocosm: Hinduism and the Organization of a Traditional Newar City in Nepal* (1992) is an exhaustive and daunting study of the city of Bhaktapur through its symbols, ideology, and ritual. Levy initially frames the study in terms of a comparison with his earlier fieldwork in Tahiti, in order to develop an evolutionary schema in which Bhaktapur represents an intermediate type between primitive and modern. As the study develops it becomes clear that the term mesocosm refers implicitly to this evolutionarily intermediate stage. More prominently, however, Levy uses the term to refer to the city as representing an intermediate "organized meaningful world" between the "microcosmic worlds of individuals and the culturally conceived macrocosm, the universe, at whose center the city lies" (2).

Reminiscent of the nineteenth century concern for the relationship of the civil society and the state, the problem is how the private world relates to the public world and how its activities are oriented to the needs and purposes defined in the public one. The private world, used by Levy in the sense of the private religious world of household rituals, simultaneously is affected by the mesocosm and provides its output—religious, social, manpower and so forth—to the intermediate religious world of the city. The mesocosm or intermediate world is organized by a system of symbols which in the city of Bhaktapur is Hinduism, given that 92% of the population and all except 60

out of 6,000 households are Hindu—"this great preponderance of Hindu Newars who are at the center of our treatment of Bhaktapur's symbolic organization" (92). The kind of city being organized is an "archaic" city (used here in the dictionary sense of characterizing "an earlier or more primitive time"—Webster's), which for Bhaktapur is a Hindu city in its full development.

The main concern of this paper is Levy's theoretical method introduced in the first part of the book, which aims to delineate the archaic Hindu city as a universal evolutionary stage and show how Bhaktapur embodies this ideal in its religious and normative everyday life. To establish his position, Levy makes a series of equivocations between Hinduism, Bhaktapur and ideal types found in the literature. Proper comparative method requires identifying the differences as well as the similarities when making analogies with ideal types, and then explaining these differences; but in favor of his argument Levy typically sets up a conditional relationship—for example, 'if this were the case then ...'—and thereafter assumes that the condition held without establishing it. The second and third parts of the book provide an exhaustive study of the religious life of the city which exonerates its theoretical failings without providing substantial support for his earlier arguments. His major mistake is that he wants to make an understanding of the city as a whole while limiting himself to the religious realm and religiously framed normative one without integrating it into the historically arisen material one—production, reproduction, consumption, distribution, exchange, classes, non-religious forms of representation and orientation, and so forth. Thus, though he claims that his purpose is to know the city and its people, my sense is that the real city as it is actually experienced by its residents is never known.

Levy's position is that symbols, particularly those from the Hindu religious realm, being a function of the intimate experience and mental organization of the residents of the city (assumed, not demonstrated), *are* significant as they make the city known to its residents (and now the ethnographer). This leads him to seeing his analysis as having to address two questions: "What is Bhaktapur that a Newar may know it, and a Newar so that he or she may know Bhaktapur?" Although Levy refers to the title of a mathematics paper as the source of these questions, they also paraphrase Dumont and Pocock's rendering of Mauss: "A sociological explanation is finished when one has seen what it is that people believe and think, and who are the people that believe and think that" (Dumont and Pocock 1956:13, quoted in Harriss 1989:127). This position was based on the premise that ideology, particularly caste ideology, ascertainable in large part in texts, constitutes Indian society.

Levy pursues this premise to assert that symbols—that is, the representations of ideology—constitute the city that is known, differing from Dumont and Pocock only in his identifying the operation of many more variables than caste. Although Levy's text repeatedly acknowledges social differentiation, it treats the Newar who knows Bhaktapur as an undifferentiated subject who can be represented by elite religious practitioners. His methodology relies on two highly educated Brahmans and a Vajracharya Sanskrit scholar and art historian, trained and employed in a major American university, to assist in the interpretation. This approach makes for a complex, interesting and authoritative analysis of Hindu symbols and the city as such, but whether interpretations by high caste, high class religious specialists reflect the variety of understanding and interests of Newars in general—ranging from businessmen, bureaucrats, Jyapu farmers, factory workers, house servants, untouchables, intellectuals, communists, and so forth—and the real material life of the city is questionable.¹ The analysis furthermore denies the possibility that other forces besides Hindu ideology affect people, ignores individual experience except in the domain of Hindu symbols, and denies significant orientations and actions except in the sphere of ritual. This is *not* to lessen the significance of the analysis, which is an exemplary and important example of the long tradition of collaboration between anthropological specialists in culture and indigenous cultural specialists—all the more significant because Levy gives recognition to the collegial role of his co-specialists.² But it *is* to dispute the claim by the study that it can represent a Bhaktapur known and experienced by Newars other than the representations of high priests and religious books,³ especially low class, low caste laborers or other exploited and depressed status individuals who make up the bulk of the population.

In order to privilege Hindu symbols, it is necessary for Levy to establish that the initial form of the city was a manifestation of Hindu ideas and that contending influences have not subsequently affected it. Levy identified the historical origin of Newars from 800 B.C., into whom a north Indian ruling class gradually merged and elaborated into an autonomous and unique Hindu Newar culture from about the fourth century B.C. Levy sees the destruction brought by the invasion of the Kathmandu valley by Shams ud-Din Illyas in 1349 as providing the conditions for rebuilding the city according to an ideal urban order, in which Hindu ideas converged with reality. This was brought to fruition by Jayasthiti Malla, who was credited with the city's laws and customs.

Jayasthiti Malla came to represent to Newars the Hindu ordering of Bhaktapur, an order built on an ancient plan ... [44].

Jayasthiti Malla revived, extended, and codified an order that built on preexisting forms and forced them into Hindu ideals of the proper form for a little kingdom, a city-state. Subsequent developments of this order must have been retrospectively credited to him, validated by his name. This order was the mesocosmic order of the Newar cities, which was to last in Bhaktapur for some 600 years [45].

That laws and decrees were framed in terms of Hindu ideas does not mean that Jayasthiti Malla was any closer to realizing them. Jayasthiti could never have established himself in a strong position unless there were elements in the society that had built sufficient strength to support him and whose interests were represented and extended by these laws: Levy points to Jayasthiti's enactment of laws making "property in houses, lands and *birtas* ...saleable" (43, quoting Wright) and allowing "his subjects to sell or mortgage their hereditary landed property" (43, quoting Padmagiri) as indication of his "reordering" of the status system. This does not indicate so much that he "made poor wretched people happy" with the institution of an ideal Hindu order as that he was appeasing certain emergent social interests over old entrenched ones. This possibly implies growing power of state servitor and merchant classes which supported the palace in their nascence but threatened to oppose it as they grew stronger, indicating a dynamic in the society, contradicting Levy's claims of changelessness in the next two pages. By giving custom the force of law, Jayasthiti was recognizing and selecting particular social interests. Most likely, he also thereby put down competing claims which may have been antagonistic towards him, making certain other poor wretches unhappy. Of course contemporary scribes, benefitting from state patronage, praised him in terms of the Hindu ideal of the time. But this is no indication that the reality converged with this ideal. One need go no further than the *Rising Nepal* or the stacks of books formulating, analyzing and praising the Panchayat and current multiparty versions of 'democracy' to see how things work, or for that matter, all the high sounding proclamations of the U.N. agencies on its programs for the teeming colonized masses. Overall, the laws and decrees of the Mallas were a strategy within a process of competition for and consolidation of power and control over material conditions, not of making life better for the poor or constructing an ideal Hindu society. Proper historical conclusions require critical use of the historical material.

Levy interprets Jayasthiti's grandson Yaksha Malla's construction of a moat around the city as both defense and "containment of the city at whose

boundaries Ananda Malla had long before placed protective goddesses. ... even more concentrated and isolated within its boundaries" (45). With his sons' division of the Valley into three kingdoms, "Bhaktapur entered on its long period of relative isolation" (46). Levy wishes to establish that the city still pretty much represents Jayasthiti's ideal in support of his 'mesocosm' hypothesis by showing that the city became isolated and changeless soon after the death of Jayasthiti. But he takes the chronicled history which makes kings into the subject of history at face value, forgetting that kings are the faces given to history and not its subject or content. Such content is found in the interplay of the various groups and social interests making up the society—the palace and its retainers, the army, landlords, merchants and especially the artisans and cultivators, who build, shape, nourish, fight and clean up with their own hands, but who rarely get a chance to write the histories and thus do not enter into them except as praising and acclaiming the acts of those who are doing the writing (as exemplified in the popular Mahabharat and Ramayana Hindi television serials). Levi's analysis in terms of legal forms and personages reinforces representations in terms of symbols, as these forms are secondary and relate through representations. But to identify change or lack of change he must look at why and for whom the moats were built and laws made. That people build moats and laws indicates perception of threat to their order and acknowledgment of change by attempts to prevent it, not changelessness. Because he excluded the countryside from his analysis, he does not show how the relationship of the city to the countryside—key to the definition of the city (Mikesell 1991)—changed or how it related to eventual downfall of the government with the conquest from the countryside.

Levy interprets the conquest by the "Indianized mountain state of Gorkha" in the eighteenth century as the incorporation of Newar society into an "enlarged territory and state" bringing the "long autonomous political history of the Newars" to an end (14-5). He sees the conquest a radical transformation because it makes the Newars into just one of many subjected ethnic groups. Yet Levy argues that because the Gorkhalis used existing institutions to build and extend their rule, Bhaktapur remained pretty much changeless throughout the subsequent Rana Rule up to the "restoration of power to the Shah King" (if "restoration" can be applied to something that existed only in myth). This allows him to say that Bhaktapur was trying to turn history into "what might seem a timeless eternal civic order. In 1973, the city, or most of it, was still trying" (15, again the 'city' is made into subject). He adds that "although under the political control of the Gorkhalis since the late eighteenth century, [Bhaktapur has been] almost untouched by Western

influences until the early 1950s."⁴ He finds support for such a view in a government document, as if these are disinterested sources:

as a major governmental development plan for the Kathmandu Valley of the Nepal government put it, Bhaktapur "has shown very little change throughout the last several decades and thus remains the purist existing documentation of historic Newar towns in the Valley" (HMG, Nepal 1969, 76) [52].

Hereby Levy attempts to establish the origins of the present character of the city in the Malla regime and its changelessness since then. Again, the historical process of conquest cannot be understood simply in terms of its outward appearance as a history of regimes and persistence of symbolic and ritual forms. One must ask what were the underlying forces and interests represented by the establishment and long preservation of the regime and *how* did these interests change. How was product controlled and distributed? What was the nature of the commerce? What was the relationship of city to countryside? How did these relations change over time and what was the effect of the Shah conquest on them? Does not the removal of the palace from Bhaktapur to Kathmandu indicate an essential change in the character of the city?

The shift of palace activities to the court in Kathmandu should indicate that the content of Bhaktapur extends to Kathmandu as well. Bhaktapur lost its status as what Max Weber calls a "princely city" with an immense shift of all the functions that go with it—the court, the gigantic job of provisioning the palace and barracks, the large class of retainers and merchants sustained by this. The commercial class in turn must have controlled much of the surplus from the land while at the same time underwriting agricultural production with credit. The subsequent exodus of Bhaktapur and Patan merchants and their establishment in bazaars the length and breadth of the new polity must be taken as a part of Bhaktapur's history as well.

Given that Bhaktapur's symbolic repertoire is drawn from North India, that it grew upon commerce with North India and Tibet, and that following the Gorkha conquest much of the political and economic content of its life shifted elsewhere in the region, I would think that proper analysis should try to locate Bhaktapur within the regional picture of class and urban development rather than attempt to contrive a closed and changeless city for heuristic purposes so analysis can proceed *as if* it were the case. As an example, Bayly's (1983) study of north India is just such an approach to urban development which places it within a regional context, links the

household and the urban order, and integrates symbols, ritual and the material world into the analysis without reducing one into another.

Levy, in contrast, attempts to build a Bhaktapur framed as a changeless city into an ideal evolutionary type standing between primitive and modern society. Given the city's changelessness, he defines it in the first of a series of equivocations in terms of Redfield and Singer's "city of orthogenetic transformation" in which "local culture was carried forward rather than broken down to be replaced by new means of relation and integration, familiar to us in Western urban history" (19). This gives typological significance to the apparent changelessness, but what of the symbols?

Levy goes on to observe that "Bhaktapur is to a very large degree characterized by a great deal of a certain kind of symbolism" to such an extent as to be "'extraordinary,' of compelling local intellectual and emotional interest." These symbols are "in large part, derived from the vast resources of South Asian 'religious' ideas and images, locally transformed, ordered, and put to use for Bhaktapur's civic purposes." When he then compares these "civic purposes" to the staging of a "choreographed ballet" in which "the city space is a carefully marked stage" (16), the implication is that the score of the ballet is found in the symbols. Furthermore, the "city's conventional arrangements of time" are "the music of the ballet" (implying that the symbols, as the score, determine the time arrangements). This allows the reduction of the lives of the city's residents to a totally predictable nature so that, "if one knows what a person's surname [*thar* or clan] is ..., his or her age and sex, what day of the lunar (for some purposes the solar) year it is, and where the person lives in Bhaktapur, one can make a plausible guess at where he or she is, what he or she is doing, and even something of what he or she is experiencing" (17).

This sounds like the claim of Levy's priestly interlocutors, who have an interest in making the lives of the city's residents subject to astrological charts, rituals and religious texts. Left unmentioned is *who* writes this score, or at least who adapts it. His choice of highly educated Brahmans in the city of Bhaktapur and American universities to assist him in interpreting the score indicates who he accepts as the subject. It furthermore is a highly determined normative order; this would require statistical evidence to verify, which is lacking in the book as it accepts the symbols, ideology and his interlocutors on their own authority. A normative order, furthermore, has to do with *everyday* life. It does not address what people are or have been *making* of their lives—educating their children, expanding their business contacts in India, pursuing posts in the government, affirming, preserving and raising their class and social position, confronting and struggling with the injustice of class and caste, building various kinds of organizations—in

short, *producing* their world in the course of reproducing it—which in my mind is what the city with its symbols and rituals is all about. In contrast, Levy's "significant action" takes us back to ritual activity.

Having made this claim for "considerable social and cultural order in Bhaktapur" (17), Levy further claims that this is a certain order that can be characterized as an "'archaic city' and 'climax Hinduism'" (18). By archaic, he apparently means that Bhaktapur is related to an earlier type of city, given its previous description in terms of an "eternal order." For this earlier type of city Levy draws an analogy with what Paul Wheatley described as the "primary urban generation," or urban civilization as it initially emerged in various areas. He derives this analogy from a need to support his position that Bhaktapur is dominated by symbols, just as the first cities were

"dominated [not by] commercial relations, a primordial market, or ... fortress, but rather [by] ceremonial complex. ... The predominantly religious focus to the schedule of social activities associated with them leaves no room to doubt that we are dealing primarily with centers of ritual and ceremonial. ... Operationally [these centers] were instruments for the creation of political, social, economic, and sacred space, at the same time as they were symbols of cosmic, social, and moral order. Under the religious authority of organized priesthoods and divine monarchs, they elaborated the redistributive aspects of the economy to a position of institutionalized regional dominance, functioned as nodes in a web of administered ... trade, served as foci of craft specialization, and promoted the development of exact and predictive sciences" [19, quoted by Levy from Wheatley 1971:225f].

From this Levy deduces:

Bhaktapur is not an ancient city in terms of historical continuity, but its organization reflects many of the same principles that have been ascribed to otherwise differing ancient cities as members of a certain type of urban community. As a member *in some respects* of such a class it might well suggest, *mutatis mutandis*, something of what they *might have been*, and *may be thought* of as an archaic city [19, emphasis added].

The question is whether the 'reflection' of the principles of the primary urban generation in the organization of Bhaktapur is one of substance and not just appearance. Levy frames the analogy with another caveat: *mutatis*

mutandis ('with necessary changes having been made/differences considered'—Websters). Instead of following up and actually considering the differences, he goes ahead to equivocate Bhaktapur with the primary urban generation. This again is incorrect usage of the comparative method because it identifies similarities and uses them to equivocate two different things without dealing with the differences or explaining the causes for these differences.

There are real problems in equating modern Bhaktapur with a primary urban generation. (1) The earliest cities in South Asia, of which Bhaktapur was not, arose as a secondary generation from the primary cities of Mesopotamia and west Asia. (2) Hinduism matured within an already advanced urban civilization prior to its entry into the Kathmandu Valley, and its expansion was accompanied by the relations of this civilization. (3) Bhaktapur was never characterized by the highly centralized redistributive economy, "elaborated ... to a regional dominance," of the primary urban generation with its assemblage of clay ration bowls. (4) Religion and symbols predominated in the primary urban generation because—in the absence of advanced commercial, industrial and military development and the associated rise of competing classes—priests monopolized power in the city. Kathmandu valley cities, in contrast, arose on the basis of comparatively well advanced regional class development. Certainly by the time of Jayasthiti Malla there could be no comparison between the two. (5) Religion only *seems* predominant in Bhaktapur because, with the Gorkhali conquest, the monarchy and its associated retainers, barracks, and provisioning and commercial activities were transferred entirely to Kathmandu; the religious aspect which seems so predominant when the city is taken in isolation is only part of the picture. It is even less significant now when we consider Bhaktapur as a part of a much larger political and commercial framework than even when the palace was located within Bhaktapur. Furthermore, as a result of the conquest, Bhaktapur's well developed and relatively independent merchant sector dispersed itself across the countryside into bazaars or shifted to Kathmandu, but nevertheless often maintained kinship and property links within Bhaktapur.

Given his equivocation of Bhaktapur with the primary urban generation, Levy now allows himself to draw an analogy between Bhaktapur and the ancient Mediterranean city described in Fustel de Coulanges' *La Cité Antique* (1864) in which, unlike in the modern city, the various levels of organization lost none of their individuality or independence.

"When different groups became thus associated, none of them lost its individuality, or its independence...."

There was a nesting of these cellular units—"family, phratry, tribe, city"—each level marked by its relevant gods and rituals, and in contrast to, say, a Frenchman, "who at the moment of his birth belongs at once to a family, a commune, a department and a country," (ibid., 128) the citizen of the ancient city moved via a series of *rites de passage* over many years into membership in successively more inclusive units.

Each increasingly inclusive level of structure ... had its proper gods and cult. ...

Each unit had its interior and its exterior, and the interior was protected by secrecy. Above all, this was true of the household. ...

The ultimate unit to which people were related at this "stage" was the ancient city itself. There was "a profound gulf which always separated two cities. However near they might be to each other, they always formed two completely separate societies. ..." (ibid., 201).

What anchored and tied together this structure of cells was its rootedness in a fixed and local space. ... The city came to define in itself its own proper social unit and was sacred for that group within the city boundaries. ...

The problem for a summary rejection of Fustel's vision is that the particular formal features of his "Ancient City" that we have chosen to review here are characteristic of Bhaktapur [20-2].

Besides similarity again being taken as unity, there are basic flaws in Coulanges's assumption that previous levels retained their individuality with the development of subsequent ones. Once a form becomes subordinated into another one it takes an entirely different content, and the content of the subordinate form must be explained in terms of the subsequent one. An adequate explanation must account for the full extent of intercourse. Furthermore, the different cellular units did not appear in terms of the order of priority subsequently given them. The Ancient patriarchal family appeared in the course of the development of the division of labor within the clan in the face of expanding intercourse and commerce, and emerged fully as a slave

holding institution only with the dissolution of lineage organized society. The separation of various levels has to do with the appearance manufactured by religion from the substance of the relations and life, in pursuit of the ends and purposes defined within the latter.

This perception of the city in terms of autonomous cellular units leads Levy in chapter 5 to argue,

for the purposes of the city's organization, we may emphasize again that it is the output of the *thar* [clan] that is essential, not its internal affairs and organization—as long as those internal features guarantee that output.

From the standpoint of ritual, this may be true, but from the standpoint of the life of the city and its production, distribution of labor, products, and so forth, for which symbols and rituals are providing the "orientation" (using Weber's term), the internal organization of the *thars* ("clan-like social unit whose members share the same surname"—774), and family extends from the purposes set for them in the larger life of the city. Changes in the form of production and reproduction of the city bring about changes in the internal productive and reproductive processes of its elements. Furthermore, the extent and forms of the *thar* and family differ according to people's social status and position within the city. For example, *thars* of low caste laborers may be truncated and insignificant, whereas those of large merchant houses may be extensive with an important role in expansion and control of mercantile capital and other properties; similarly, for prominent Brahmans the patriarchal family is the means of expanding the pool of clients.

In addition, Levy's identification of Bhaktapur with the early ancient Mediterranean city has basic problems. First, it contradicts his previous analogy with Wheatley's "primary urban generation" because the Mediterranean cities arose already as a secondary urban form with well advanced class development, commerce, agriculture, and so forth. Second, Levy finds himself confronted with the problem of explaining how such a city can persist into the late twentieth century Asia when, as he points out, it had already disappeared by the middle of the first millennium B.C. in the Mediterranean as

part of a worldwide wave of 'breakthroughs' within the orbit of the 'higher civilizations,' during the first 700 or 800 years before the Christian Era in an 'axial age' consisting in the 'transcendence' of the limiting definitions and controls of these ancient forms Those who did not participate in this transformation have simply been rejected as ancestors of the modern world [22-3].

Levy makes the claim that due to "the lack of a politically unifying force" the heterodoxies of this axial age, with their "powerfully transcending attack on the symbolically constituted social order" (23), never succeeded in asserting themselves in India, and thus the subcontinent did not go through such an "axial transition."

What did prevail was ultimately the static social order of Hinduism, which, whatever its peripheral inclusion in their proper place of the socially transcendent gestures of renunciation and mysticism, was hardly any kind of 'breakthrough' into whatever the idea of an axial 'transformation' was meant to honor.

All of which is to suggest that traditional India and Bhaktapur, *in so far as* it may be characteristic of traditional India, are very old fashioned places indeed [23, emphasis added].

First of all, Levy introduces another unsubstantiated conditionality ("in so far as") in order to make an equivocation. The point that he wants to make is that an unchanged Bhaktapur never lost the character of the "primary urban generation," so that symbols may seem as still constituting the city's social order. It would follow then that an analysis of the symbols will actually allow the ethnographer to discover the Bhaktapur that people know and the people who know Bhaktapur. However, the constituting character of symbols is contradicted by the argument that the existence of a politically unifying force is necessary for making the axial transition. Political unification presumes sufficient development of production, commerce and industry, along with correspondent development of social relations, to provide a material base for such unification. Herein he contradicts his general position that symbols constitute the social relations.

To complicate matters further, the ancient Mediterranean city states did not experience lasting political unification until the rise of the Roman Empire, several hundred years later than the period attributed to the "axial transformation." It was the lack of political unity that provided the scope for innovation and ferment. The subsequent political unification was a period marked by intellectual constriction and reduction of the civil versus the political—a situation from which Europe did not recover for another millennium (Southall n.d.).

As Bhaktapur, like "traditional India," has failed to make the axial transition to modern society, Levy contemplates the question of what the city is to be. Although Bhaktapur has not become modern, neither is it the

opposite pole of the dichotomy—primitive—since according to Wheatley "the society of the temple-city was neither fully *contractus*, *civitatis*, *Gesellschaft* nor organic" (1971:349, quoted on p. 24). Disagreeing with Ernst Gellner's (1974) position that such a middle ground did not make up any sort of distinctive type, Levy sees that Bhaktapur is an intermediate stage which provides

a kind of continent in the Great Divide, which has its own distinctive typological features, exemplifies its own distinctive and important principles in relation to both sociocultural organization and to thought, distinctive features that are blurred and lost in these classical oppositions. Bhaktapur and places that might have been analogous to it in the ancient world are illuminating for this middle terrain. Neither primitive nor modern, Bhaktapur has its own exemplary features of organization and of mind [25].

Thus Bhaktapur, as an ancient city, is indeed distinctive, a sort of missing link between the primitive and modern. The question then is in *what* sense is Bhaktapur distinctive. The significant feature in the ancient city as opposed to the primitive is that due to the enlarged size and complexity of a society no longer based on face-to-face interaction, "culturally shaped common sense" is insufficient for integrating the community. Thus in Bhaktapur (and archaic cities in general) people must use "'marked symbols' ... to solve the problems of communication induced by magnification of scale" (26). Marked symbols are those in which "meaning must *evidently* be sought elsewhere than in what the object or event seems to mean 'in itself.' They are opposed to 'embedded symbols' which are "associated with cultural structuring of 'common sense.'"

It is untrue that "primitive" people do not utilize both marked and embedded symbols. The difference between the archaic city and primitive society was not that the former did not use marked symbols, but that the associations of these symbols were facilitated and controlled by a class of specialists, a priesthood, which had emerged out of a well-developed division of labour. These priesthoods elaborated and developed out of the ritual practitioners of the clan organized societies and priest-kings of the segmentary states (Southall 1956, 1984, 1988), some of which complexly integrated people on a continental scale (Wolf 1982)—certainly no longer face-to-face organization. The difference was that urban society was organized no longer primarily in terms of ranked clans but now in terms of separate strata of families, or classes, within a clear division of labor based on landed

property. Although Levy describes the ranked clans as the normative order of the society, these serve as an organizing principle and ideological framework but are no longer the substance of the society. Urban class based divisions of labor developed on the basis of the domestication of plants and animals and development of associated technologies which marked the "Neolithic Revolution" from 20-7,000 B.C. The role and use of symbols in archaic cities was derived from these developments, and the difference between primitive society and the archaic cities must be dealt with in these terms.⁵

Once priest classes had emerged, then the "marked" character or inaccessibility of symbols (in terms of the interpretations Levi chose to privilege, that is) took on the added character of being accessible only through the interpretation of priests. As symbols in Bhaktapur could not be satisfactorily interpreted (from the anthropologist's viewpoint) by lay people (or elders, medicine wo[men], shamans or other rudimentary specialists among them), and Levy, following Dumont, felt he had to go to a class of specialists and texts to properly interpret the symbols, he evidently mixed up this control of interpretation of the marked character of symbols by priests with the marked character itself. This led him to deduce that archaic cities were differentiated from primitive society by the dichotomy in the embedded versus marked character of symbols.

He is misled because he was operating under the assumption that the symbols were significant on their own terms (in which a particular Brahmanical interpretation is privileged *a priori*). He identified characteristics in the control and use of symbols in society as being properties of symbols themselves. Furthermore, if he had not stopped his analysis at the ideological sphere, but continued to analyze the social aspects from which the symbols were derived—the class makeup of the city, markets, the division of labor and so forth—he would have been forced to question the other equivocations that he was making—Bhaktapur as "archaic city," "city of orthogenetic transformation," "primary urban generation," "ancient city," lack of "axial transformation" and so forth. Instead, he proceeds along an entirely different path.⁶

Bhaktapur ... can be considered to have ... typological analogies with archaic cities insofar as it represents a community elaborately organized on a spatial base through a system of marked symbolism. The particular symbolic system made use of is a variant of Hinduism. ... Hinduism is in many of its features, which we contrast with the "world historical religions," a system for and of what we have called 'archaic urban order. [27-8]

His logic is that if Bhaktapur is organized on spatial base through a system of marked symbolism, then it has typological analogies with archaic cities. Having shown here that marked symbolism in itself is not a distinguishing characteristic of archaic cities, the typological analogies that the city may have with archaic cities are meaningless. Hinduism provides the symbols. Evidently because Hinduism was determined to not have made an axial transformation, it has "in many of its features ... a system for and of ... archaic urban order" (28): ahistoricity, rootedness in local space, pantheon and inheritance, distributive of godhead into pantheon and sacred in the here and now (27). But many of his "world historical religions," especially in their orthodox forms with their saints, pilgrimage sites, and so forth, have similar elements.

Accepting that Bhaktapur represents an archaic urban order (disputed here), Levy needs to define the extent of that order so as to ascertain the limits necessary for understanding Bhaktapur and its Newars. For this he utilizes Dumont's "little kingdoms," which emerge out of and are absorbed into larger polities with the wax and wane of empires, to provide a territorial framework for his conceptual whole. Following Dumont (who was criticizing the use of the *village* as a social whole), he presents Bhaktapur, in another equivocation, with this atomistic unit as the "social whole" that anthropologists were looking for in the village.

Whatever the shifting historical relations between caste and territorial units might have been, the conditions that allowed for the formation and development of little kingdoms allowed for the fulfillment of Hinduism's potentials for ordering a community. Such little kingdoms seem to have represented, to borrow a term from ecology, 'climax communities' of Hinduism, where it reached the full development of its potentials for systematic complexity, and with it a temporary stability, an illusion of being a middle world, a *mesocosm*, mediating between its citizens and the cosmos, a *mesocosm* out of time" [28].

His argument here is that the Hindu ideal type is a little kingdom, the little kingdom is a social whole of limited extent, established within a definite territory and self sufficient, therefore the little kingdom is a 'climax community'⁷ allowing for the full development of Hinduism's potentials. Defining the community in terms of political characteristics, more specifically political symbols, in a city with an important commercial aspect seems to be stacking the deck. An important basis of cities, even primary

urban generations, almost by definition was not self sufficiency but trade, which is a recognition of integration and a whole which transcends the city. Political orders usually have an interest in presenting themselves for legitimization purposes as a social whole, but this must not be mixed up with their substance.

In the last section of the second chapter Levy, believing that he has defined Bhaktapur, returns to the question of "what is a Newar that he or she may know Bhaktapur?" He approaches this by summing up the differences between primitive society and an "archaic" Bhaktapur. He describes the primitive in terms of "mind-forged manacles" in which thought is relatively homogeneous, takes the rural for granted and is directly mediated by symbols which appear as common sense reality—in other words, non-transcendent. This is compared to the complex experience of the people of Bhaktapur, for whom symbols contain many realities. From this he deduces that it is difficult for the primitive folk to engage in critical philosophical thought and discourse and thus they can only be passive subjects of anthropological analysis, while the people of Bhaktapur, being able to engage in skeptical and critical analysis, are able to become potential collaborators with the anthropologist (29-30). Since primitive people cannot engage in critical thought, they cannot deal with incompatibilities—which they consequently relegate to the unconsciousness—and they engage in their actions because they see them as "natural," although outsiders see them as constructed (30). In contrast, the people of Bhaktapur deal with contradictions, but by providing satisfying answers and enchantment in the form of marked symbols. Only do the moderns free themselves of marked symbolism and relegate it to just being symbolism. Here I think again empirical data contradicts all three pictures. Anyone who has lived through the uncritical standoff of communism versus capitalism, as just one example of the complex "constructions" of "modern" society, must reflect back on it as an immense elaboration of marked symbolism and self delusion, a complete abandonment of critical thought and sanity by entire modern civilization, and a waste of an entire generation and immense planetary resources. Ironically, some of the most coherent criticism of the constructed character of the moderns' symbols was coming from "primitives" such as the American Plains Indians more than a hundred years ago when confronted with the genocidal expansionism of industrial capitalism (see Dee Brown's *I Buried My Heart at Wounded Knee*, as an example).

Documentation of extremely critical thought among the so-called primitives negates Levy's position and makes me think rather that the difference he sees in Bhaktapur arises from his choice of elite intelligentsia who, due to their advanced education and western university training, make

basically the same assumptions that he does. Even for the Bhaktapur intellectuals, however, he terms them "literati," involved in "uncritical speculation," as opposed to modern critical intellectuals, since the former have yet to pass through the axial transformation which would allow them to transcend themselves. Conrád and Szenlényi (1978) have identified these contrasts as two poles of a gradient of roles for intelligentsia as a generic class type, in which on the one end they can accept the assumptions and purposes set by society, particularly in their role as pure technicians or "technical intelligentsia"—dealing with knowledge concerned with implementation (*techné*)—or on the other end they can address the assumptions and ultimate ends (*telos*) of society as "teleological intellectuals."⁸ In practice most intellectuals combine both aspects to fall somewhere in between on the gradient. Being modern does not necessarily make an intellectual radical nor does being primitive preclude a critical consciousness.

In the concluding chapter of the book Levy addresses a similar dichotomy within the symbolic sphere of Bhaktapur between the specialists in "ordinary dharma" and the "cult of dangerous deities," concerned with political power and operations not produced fully by assent to the dharmic value system, on one side, and the specialists in "dharma" and "ordinary Brahmanical religion," concerned with values and norms, on the other (601-9). Levy identifies the former specialists, involved in direct "manipulation of materials and force" (603), as the tantric priests and Brahmans serving the role of tantric priests. He identifies the latter, "manipulators of purity," concerned with salvation, as the Brahmans. Yet as regularizers of dharma, the Brahmans also seem to be technical, while as shapers of the conditions of power, the tantric priests seem to be teleological.

With all this Levy aims to critique Dumont's delineation of secular versus religious spheres, showing that both the "common order" (dealing with issues of power and force and generally addressing the issues referred to as secular) and the "strange, mostly religious," order (dealing with religious values and norms) are actually contained within a larger "religious universe," each with its own gods and religious practitioners as described above. By identifying Dumont's analysis as being too singular, when there are many other oppositions⁹ involved which crisscross the sacred versus secular oppositions, he is able to show that action in both orders is oriented through religious symbols and ritual. However, though he recognizes that the "common order" addresses issues of concern to individuals other than religious functionaries, because he treats symbols as priors, he ends up circling around again and framing the entire issue in terms of gods and symbols, without being able to provide insight into the secular or material

realm, or the substance of its relation to the ritual one. I address this issue in a book in preparation:

The fact that an "ideal" [the symbolic] exists as the determining purpose of activity makes it easy to assume that the ideas or their mediating symbols constitute the material world. People's ideal conceptions, however, arise according to the conditions of their existence, which themselves are products of previous activity. This is not an economic determinism or reductionism as is often made of this perspective. Ideas and institutions *do* orient and determine human life, but always as the products of previous activity and according to the conditions provided by it. Only when ideas are looked at in isolation from the historical context given by previous human activity do they seem to be constituting the material world [Mikesell n.d.]

The final chapter of the first section of the book attempts to address the question of the material base of the city, what Levy calls "the other order." However, Levy's aim is to selectively reinforce his thesis of changelessness with reference to non-symbolic elements—spatial and ecological constraints, production and distribution, demography and so forth. He makes a vague jab at materialist¹⁰ and structuralist approaches for their tendency to de-emphasize symbols as "epiphenomenal or 'expressive' or at best to some modestly supplementary status" (53). The critique is valid, but Levy in turn limits his consideration of the orientation given by symbols to ritual and symbolically framed normative actions rather than relating them to historical action—outside the official history of kings and regimes, that is.

The bent of his argument is to reinforce the position of Bhaktapur's timelessness. Of the physical city he argues that its appearance has changed little from the end of the reign of Malla kings. He finishes with a description of decay, filth, earthquakes, fruit bats and jackals which steal children with the observation: "All this is a reminder that Bhaktapur was and is still a clearing in a yet more ancient world" (56). Of the demography he concludes, "All available indexes suggested that at the time of this study Bhaktapur's population was, and had been for a very long time, quite stable" (58). Of the population density he argues that the urban areas of Kathmandu have one of the highest population densities in the world of five to seven hundred persons per square mile, almost twice that of New York City, and Bhaktapur has a population of 117,000 per sq. mi., which is to imply that the city is a more crowded living space.

Without secondary analysis which deals with the two sets of data within their proper context, the comparison is superficial and spurious. New York City has large financial and industrial centers with non-residential industrial and office space. Great amounts of space are given over to the automobile transport system and public parks. And much of the population is dispersed to residences in outlying suburban areas and neighboring bedroom communities. In other parts of the city very large populations are densely packed into urban ghetto housing and public works housing—"The Projects"—with unrecorded "doubling up" of poor families (Dehavenon and Boone 1992). On Bhaktapur's side, given the city's largely agricultural population, as documented by Levy, the agricultural lands must be counted as part of Bhaktapur's urban space, which would greatly reduce the population density.

For the relationship with the central government Levy outlines the formal political organization and stresses its centralized character, implying that "modern" type politics have not yet entered into the city. "For the time being ... at the city level Bhaktapur has little effective local political control. There is plenty of politics within some of the component units of the traditional city organization, but that is another matter" (62). Although the activity of parties, underground at the time of his study, was not in its domain, ignoring the subsequent assertion of Communist Party control over city politics, the conditions and forces that gave rise to it, and the contradictions involved¹¹ allows Levy to avoid issues that would in many aspects contradict his analysis—that city politics takes an essentially "traditional" form, the city's changelessness and archaic character, the uncritical character of the city's intelligentsia as a literati, the exclusivity of a symbolic orientation, and so forth. Even if the communists were inaccessible to the analysts at that time, adequate analysis requires that the theory must subsequently be remade to fit all the facts and not stick to a certain, incomplete and highly selective kind of facts for heuristic purposes.¹²

In dealing with the agricultural economy, Levy observes that as the proportion of farmers is similar to that of rural communities, "Bhaktapur and its hinterland do not represent the familiar urban-peasant polarization prevalent elsewhere" (62). He argues that the agriculture is subsistence oriented, and that cash comes from non-farm activities and farm product sales. That sixty percent of the farming households own some land and pay 25 to 28 percent of the value of the produce in rents is attributed to the Land Acts dating from 1957 onwards. As a result, citing Acharya and Ansari (1980:113), he argues that the differentiation in income is much less than that found in Kathmandu or Patan (68-9). Assuming the success of the Land Acts he argues, without data, that the redistribution of land has preserved

conservatism by taking the land from the hands of "traditional landowning classes, the Brahmans and merchants," into those of the more conservative "farmers."

The land reforms with their resulting marked improvement in the economic and social position of the farmers in Bhaktapur has [sic] had an unintended effect. To the degree that traditional landowning classes, the Brahmans and merchants, lost their lands and land revenues and the farmers gained them, the newly wealthy farmers have come to be the supporters and clients of much of the traditional religious system as well as important employers of Brahmans. Less educated and less open to modernization than the higher classes, this transition has helped to slow down change and to support and conserve the old system [64].

This position, which contradicts one quoted from M. C. Regmi that the land reform had little effect, seems to be an apology for the modernization thesis that argues that progressive "rich" farmers are the agents of modernization; interestingly, his high caste interlocutors come from among the progressive group. In fact, the ownership of "some land," but not the most productive land, is an integral part of the general system of exploitation. The whole position indicates how the ethnographer can unconsciously become an unwitting collaborator in the class programs of his indigenous interlocutors, who themselves may unconsciously accept it as "common sense." By restricting itself to the symbolic sphere, the analysis limits its ability to take a critical stance and leads the anthropologist into the role of Levy's literati.

The whole analysis of "the other order" comes down to reinforcing Levy's main thesis that the city is changeless, justifying his designation of it as an archaic city stuck somewhere between the primitive and modern.

We have described a city that ... still retained many of the features which had long characterized it ... dense but stable population ... relatively little related to larger economic and political networks. Its economy, which had a large nonmonetary component, was still heavily based on internal (including its bordering farms) production and exchange. For the city as a whole it was more of an administered than a political unit, the sources of power and decision were elsewhere, in the non-Newar national government at Kathmandu. That external administration was minimally disruptive, and it was certainly not innovative. *Bhaktapur was then in both fact and ideology "self sufficient" and turned in on itself* [68, italics added].

In contrast, I have emphasized throughout this critique that Bhaktapur *appears* to be "self sufficient and turned in upon itself" because the full urban culture encompasses something wider than just the city itself, particularly a city defined in terms of Brahmanic texts, which Levy mistakenly attributes as being a "totality." As he says that it was "in fact" so, his analysis must also account for facts that argue otherwise.

This dichotomy of microcosm and mesocosm strongly parallels that of civil society and the state, which raises questions of the autonomy of the two spheres and the validity of speaking in terms of a separate mesocosm at all. The nineteenth century critique of this twentieth century argument was that contradictions that appear in the state originate out of the processes, interests and struggles within the civil society, and that not only are the two spheres not autonomous from each other, but that the state is constituted by the civil society rather than the other way around. The same sort of argument may be made here for the symbolic, which for Levy *is* the state in Bhaktapur, as opposed to the material world.

Notes

1. On this matter Declan Quigley (whose highly pertinent book I only obtained after completing this essay) writes that a mistake of the colonial understanding of caste "is the assumption that there is one unambiguous interpretation of the *varna* system which outstanding Sanskrit scholars have access to. The *varna* system is a set of ideas developed to explain an early division of labour, but these ideas have always been interpreted in different, contradictory ways" (1993:16). Even among Brahmins there are "at least six different Brahmanic personae, with dramatically conflicting characteristics, [which] manifest themselves in the Hindu world" (1993:56). Levi's use of university students and instructors as collaborators and authorities further complicates the picture, as does the existence of Brahmins as prime ministers, party leaders, and promoters of the sale of public enterprises to Indian businessmen and of IMF restructuring, World Bank programs, and so on.
2. This should reciprocally highlight the anthropologist's *own* collaborative relation with his indigenous specialist collaborators, particularly when he privileges their particular perspective as having authority over alternative views, statuses, and discourses in society. As Quigley (1993:48) reminds us, giving over authority to a particular view necessarily implies providing power with legitimacy: legitimacy of the class interests and programs his collaborators extend out of and represent. ("There cannot ... be status (authority) without power. The

very concept of authority is premised on the idea that there is some relation of unequal power which would be problematic if not legitimated.")

3. If he is to refer to texts, it seems to me that school text books, which most young people of all social classes read, or now cable television would be much more valid.
4. This is debateable; but what is certain is that the city was greatly transformed due to its defeat by Prithivi Narayan Shah, causing it to lose its character as a 'political' city (Weber) and in large part many elements of its commercial character: supplying garrisons, etc.
5. See Mikesell (1991) for preliminary discussion of the process with reference to South Asia and Nepal.
6. Quigley (1993:48) makes the same point: "But what Brahmanism represents as devine, unalterable truth, sociological comparisons quickly demonstrate to be contingent on a particular conjunction of factors thrown up by particular historical conditions. What Brahmanism cannot do (because to do so would be to deny its own legitimacy) is to explain what these conditions are, and why caste is not timeless as the ideology of Brahmanical purity would have us believe. Any adequate explanation must go beyond its conditional Brahmanical validation."
7. It seems somewhat inappropriate to apply the term of climax community, which refers to a system of mutually interlinked biological organisms which have filled out the various ecological niches to the extent that they live together in a system of relative stasis—in which the subject is natural laws—to a highly differentiated and divided class society—in which the subject is human activity. As various traditions of sociology and history have addressed this issue and have developed an array of more appropriate terms, there is no need to go outside the discipline for a term.
8. Hegel, for example, was a modern "critical" intelligentsia to a point, but beyond that he was a literati, serving as an apologist for the Kaiser's regime. Similarly, Lenin was revolutionary until he came to power, then once in power he started rationalizing the regime with his doctrine of revolution in one country.
9. Dangerous deities vs. benign deities, tantric religion vs. ordinary religion, secular vs. religious, conventional vs. ritual, king vs. Brahman vs. other kinds of priests and polluting *thars*, worldly power vs. other worldly force, unclean sweeper vs. clean Brahman, purity irrelevant to order vs. purity relevant to order, bordering/outside city vs. inside city, pre-initiation vs. after initiation.

10. Specifically the dependency theory variation on materialism which Cameron, Seddon and Blaikie are the early foreign proponents and which is taught as "conflict theory" in the indigenous social science departments—and which in contradistinction to my own understanding beginning with creative activity or production, focuses on structures such as "infrastructures" mentioned disparagingly by Levy.
11. For example, the strife between Communist and Congress, and between the CP(M-L) and CP(Farm Labor) parties along the lines of untouchables versus Jyapu farmers, and the patron-client type leadership of the latter by a son of one of the big landowning families despite claims of being a workers' party.
12. At the time of his study, furthermore, there were other struggles brewing, such as the intense fight over the control of the Bhaktapur literacy programs arranged for Newar women between the women's groups and the Panchas (promulgating the government textbook financed and designed by international aid agencies—USAID, UNICEF, World Education, etc.—and accompanying pro-Panchayat reading materials versus locally developed curriculum). The women never capitulated, although they and the program workers were harassed, jailed and beaten by the police. Levi's presentation of his limited analysis as the whole of Bhaktapur does great injustice to such initiatives and justifies reactionary policies against them in a struggle that continues unabated under the guise of "preserving" democracy.

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BOOK REVIEW

Industrial Growth in Nepal. 1994. Govinda Prasad Regmi. New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Pages XI + 235 including appendices.

Govind Prasad Regmi's book under review is a valuable contribution to the state of Nepal's industrial development. Divided into nine chapters, the book is a revised version of the author's doctoral dissertation. Chapter I deals with the objectives and methodology whereas chapter II concentrates mainly on the strategies and dependency analysis of industrialisation based on social and politicoeconomic relations between the centre and the periphery originating from colonial times. Since the analysis revolves around the conventional argument that the growth and development of the centre were based on and financed by the exploitation of the periphery either through imports of raw materials or exports of manufactured products to the periphery, the intention of the author seems to reveal the adverse effect of such mechanism on the growth and development of underdeveloped countries. The dependency paradigm, which goes beyond the classical view of centre-periphery equation that demands host of other structural elements into consideration, however, remains unexplained in the present book. Chapter III on the industrial growth in the Nepalese economy bypasses the operating system, method and issues on industrial production under the broader area of industrial production when the author analyses issues like technology, productivity levels and so forth.

Chapter IV while analysing the distribution, structure and growth of manufacturing industries in various regions of the country concludes that the percentage share of industrial units located in the Eastern and central regions has declined over the years, whereas those units located in the Western, Mid-Western and Far Western regions increased throughout the period of 1965-66 to 1986-87. An attempt is made to review other areas that help reduce regional imbalances in industrialization, like the development of transport, communication and power sectors, besides associating the connectivity with India in the bordering areas regarding the determination of the locational pattern of the industries. Further details on the Nepalese and Indian market

Contributions to Nepalese Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (July 1993).
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sife, export market and so forth with a separate provision of the discussion of market of industrial product would have been an added advantage in reviewing the structure and growth patterns at various levels of industrial aggregation.

Capital-output ratio and profitability rate is calculated to find out capital requirement and profitability rates. Fair professional exercise is found to have been completed to analyse the sources of finance of various manufacturing industries and their capital structures in Chapter V.

Chapter VI attempts to estimate partial productivity of manufacturing industry, calculate total factor productivity indices, estimate the Cobb-Douglas production function and finally examine wage differentials across manufacturing industries by regions and major occupations. The study reveals that inspite of increases in labour productivity, the overall share of wages in value added declined over the study period of 1972-73 to 1986-87. Since the study has found out that the increases in labour productivity achieved during the study period were primarily determined by increases in capital intensity, the author disqualifies a previous study which concludes that increased supply of labour due to improved transport network as well as decreased skill intensity resulted in a decline in the share of wages.

Commendable work has been done in the calculation of total factor productivity index to examine the total factor productivity by industries and has found out that the manufacturing sector as a whole experienced a decline in total productivity over the years.

An attempt has been made in Chapter VII to review alternative measures of import substitution by comparing import availability ratios between two periods, current and previous. Similarly to assess the overall demand and supply situations of manufactured goods in the country, an analysis has been made on the domestic production, imports, exports and total supply situations by industrial commodities.

The study reveals that because of the import restrictions, only in the supply of a few consumer goods like beverages, cigarettes and tobacco, animal feed, and so forth, Nepal seemed to have attained an almost self-sufficient stage during 1981-82. However, several studies have exhibited that despite the import substitution orientation in consumer goods, substitution has been very limited, due mostly to the slow growth in domestic production in comparison to the growth in imports.

It is true that import substitution has been a major source of growth of industrial output in Nepal's economy, especially for investment goods. However, because of the fact that much of the consumer goods are still imported, they also provide a greater scope for further import substitution. In other words, the demand for such goods is so huge that it is not possible in the short-run to minimise imports.

The author's contribution in Chapter VIII lies only in highlighting the features of Selected Industrial Policies until 1987 on an *ad hoc* basis. Frequent changes in industrial policies, unreliable and unnecessarily delayed mechanism to offer committed incentives by the government, weaker employment generation schemes in the industrial sector, poor planning of investment in successive policies regarding specific product and size which have comparative advantages and so forth are not found documented appropriately to the extent a critical analysis of any industrial policy may demand. Some remarkable developments in the Industrial Policy, 1987, like the relaxation of licensing and registration procedure and revision in the level of effective rate of protection are also given insufficient treatment. Since policies on industry, foreign investment and one window, technology transfer, industrial enterprises and so forth that came during 1992 are not within the preview of the present work, confusing terminology 'liberalisation policies' (p. 156) without proper introduction could have been replaced by the term like 'economic reforms' and linked it with major features of the above mentioned new policies.

Chapter IX incorporates common features of less developed economies like higher share of consumer goods industries in the total manufacturing output, domination of consumer goods industries by food manufacturing, gradual emergence of investment goods industries as a component of modern manufacturing and so on. No effort seems to have been done to correlate the major findings of the study with the objectives and schemes prepared in Chapter I.

A creative and authoratative work with such a high level of expertise becomes an extremely pathetic venture when one quickly goes through Chapter VIII and IX. The mission of the scheme to offer critical appraisal of industrial policies in Chapter VIII and an effort to provide synoptic view of the major findings uniformly and rather exhaustibly in Chapter IX are defeated. Continuity is thus broken, coherence forgotten, and professionalism shaken. If we look at the work in its entirety, the author should nevertheless be commended for making an attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of important facts of industrialisation in the context of the changing Nepalese economic scenario.

– Bishwambher Pyakuryal